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INTRODUCTION 
The problem with which this thesis deals is an old one. 
Since man first began to think with sophistication about the 
truth or falsity of his beliefs, he has sought an answer to 
the epistemic problem of the relationship between his 01in sub-
jective thoughts and the actual objects in nature. As various 
answers have been given, certain crucial issues have appeared 
again and again. No analysis of the epistemic problem can be 
judged adequate without attempting a solution of the foll01fing 
five problems. 
Dualism 
All experience appears to be dualistic. In each act 
of knowledge, the subject which knows has before it an object 
which is known. This experience leads to the problem of the 
existential status of the object. Dualists hold that the 
intentional object is also a real object in the external world. 
All thinkers have not agreed to the same type .of dualism to be 
sure; some conceive it very naively as a relation between the 
soul or mind and substantial things in nature, e.g. Locke, 
while others, e.g. Berkeley, as ideas in the mind compared with 
God the cause of all ideas. It may be argued that Hume, in 
his very strict and consistent moments was not dualistic; 
yet these moments proved too much for him and he often slipped 
1 
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back into a Lockean dualism. But Hume does point up the 
problem. A very rigorous analysis dissolves both external 
substance and the inner soul substance as objects o~ knowledge. 
If dualism is maintained, how are sense i~pressions and ex-
ternal objects conceived to be in interaction and relation? 
What definition can be given to the object which will escape 
the accusation that it is merely a modification of the sub-
ject? Oan Hume's destruction of the concept of causality 
(redefined from a power transferred from object to object 
to mere habituation) in turn be destroyed? Any epistemic 
dualism must hold that in some manner, subject and object 
are similar, or at least related in some valid~ way. If they 
are not, then there is never any real knowledge of the object. 
Oan this similarity, however, be thought of as an image after 
the similitude of a photograph to its object? Oan a moment of 
experience be similar to a material, extended thing? 
Subjectivism 
Berkeley's answer to the latter question would be that 
an idea can only be like another idea; there is no such thing 
as material substance. The conclusion of this position, 
however, as Hume saw so clearly, .states that there is nothing 
in the world but ideas, and there are no ideas which are not 
my own. Berkeley wanted to have a God in back of ideas, but 
this God vanished under analysis, since every ounce of 
evidence for God turned out to be an idea in the subject. Is 
there any incontrovertible evidence that one's experience has 
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a reference beyond present awareness in such a manner that it 
can be said that one knows something besides one's own mind? 
If there is no positive proof, then is there some ground of 
reasonable speculation, or even faith, perhaps instinctive or 
animal faith, that one is in contact with an outside world? 
Skepticism. 
If there is no way to get beyond ourselves, then 
Protagoras is a hero in saying man is the measure of all that 
appears to him. Most men, however, have given accolades to 
Plato who believed that the good life both demanded and demon-
strated objective truth. If we then possess truth of the out-
side world, is this knowledge always certain, or must we be 
tt content with some approximation, some degree of probability? 
Justification of Empirical Knowledge 
For those who content themselves with some approxi-
mation or probability of truth, the problem of the justification 
of such truth becomes a major problem. Under the deductive 
method each true proposition follows necessarily from a given 
proposition; but what kind of relation exists between 
propositions which are less than certain and necessary? Oan 
these really be .called knowledge? Empiricists have looked to 
experience as the sole source of knowledge, stating that 
universal and necessary propositions are tauto1ogica1.1 The 
1A. J. Ayer, Language Truth and Logic (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 104. 
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e inductive method reasons from a limited number of observations 
to a conclusion that goes beyond any :finite number of obser-
vations. An hypothesis is made and receives continuing con-
firmation which can only be given by :future experience. As 
these experiences are received and collated with the hypothesis, 
the hypothesis is either confirmed or disconfirmed by some 
probability :factor expressed in a mathematical :formula. 
Though the persistent :fallacy to substitute deductive in-
ferences obtained :from a mathematically constructibie series 
:for the actual series of :frequency ratios is often present, it 
remains :forever true that the hypothesis itself is never 
certain. The very nature of induction prohibits certainty 
while in :finitude. 
On the deductive principle the consequent follows 
ne_cessarily :from the antecedent. On the inductive method'. the 
consequent or the hypothesis does not :follow necessarily. The 
result, many feel, fs the collapse of any real inference in 
inductive logic due to the absence of true causality. No 
hypothesis is caused by a series of observation, or to put it 
in a manner more pleasing to some, no sentence predicting a 
future event thereby makes the :future certain. If certainty 
is absent, and event B is not caused by event A, then is there 
real knowledge or is there only Humean habit at the center of 
empirical knowledge? 
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The Relation of Epistemology to Metaphysics 
The distinction between the order of existence and the 
order of knowing seems to be valid. Without doubt, any 
discussion of one soon leads to the other, si~ce it makes no 
sense to talk about a reality which is unknown, or to talk of 
knowledge about nothing. The problem comes in delineating the 
place of each order. Some have begun their discussion by pre-
supposing a knowledge of existence or reality which in·, ,turn 
prescribes and controls the search in the area of epistemology. 
A case in point is the Platform of the Association for Realistic 
Philosophy which begins by making three metaphysical assertions 
which come close to determining the nature of epistemology.l 
Berkeley and other idealists have been charged, through the 
'egocentric predicament', of commi~ng the fallacy of initial 
predication by which the nat~e. of reality is determined from 
the start to be mental and nothing else. 
Such procedure, .of course, can not be countenanced by 
true 1 lovers of wisdom•. Any form of question begging must be 
rejected. It must ever be remembered that the knowledge about 
reality, existence, nature, and God, is actually a product of 
the order of knowledge. Of course, it is true, that the realm 
of knowledge has as its basic ground the realm of existence, 
but the starting point must be the epistemic situation, not 
the sophisticated conclusions of metaphysics. Unless it is 
1John Wild (ed.), The Return to Reason (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1953), PP• 357-363. 
true that the order of knowledge can be investigated inde-
pendent of the order of existence, every system will collapse 
in the confusion of subjective claims about the nature of the 
real. It is philosophically unjustifiable to assume certain 
knowledge before the establishment of a standard or validity 
of any knowledge. 
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The discouraging fact that a great number of proffered 
answers to these five crucial issues has been forsaken 
is counterbalanced by the encouraging fact that new and more 
adequate answers are being given today. One of the most 
astute theories set forth by a contemporary philosopher is that 
of Brand Blanshard who offers a theory whereby the gulf between 
subject and object is bridged by means of ideas. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain, interpret, 
and evaluate critically Brand Blanshard's theory of ideas as 
given in his magnum opus, The Nature of Thought.1 Other works 
by Blanshard are considered, though they do not enlarge or 
alter the position given in The Nature of Thought. 
Chapter One is a direct exposition of Blanshard's 
theory. Chapter Two investigates Blanshard'a relationship 
to his immediate predecessors, the English and American abso-
lute idealists, in order to determine whether or not his re-
vision of their thesis is major or minor, and at what points. 
1Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought (2 vola.; 
London: George Allen &·Unwin Ltd., 1939). Subsequent references 
to this work use the abbreviation, NOT. 
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Chapter Three is an analysis of Brand Blansbard 1 s reply to 
neo-realism and critical realism which allegedly nrefuted 1 
absolute idealism. Chapter Four is concerned with a critical 
evaluation of Brand Blanshard's theory of ideas. 
CHA.:PTER ONE 
GENERAL STATEMENT OF BLANSHARD'S THEORY OF IDEAS 
From the delineation of the problem of knowledge out-
lined in the Introduction, we now turn directly to Blanshard's 
discussion as developed primarily in The Nature of Thought. 
The work consists primarily in the development of two avenues 
of research concerning human knowledge. 
The first, growing out of a need created by philoso-
phical and psychological studies since the turn of the century, 
is concerned with empirical psychology. Nearly all previous 
thinkers who developed an idealistic philosophy depended upon 
logic and the introspective method in psychology for support 
and justification of their theories. Since modern thinkers 
rejected these methods of finding ufactsn, and turned instead 
to physiological or experimental psychology, ·Blanshard wanted 
to study their findings in order to determine whether or not 
the conclusions of former idealistic thinkers was brought to 
ruin. The result is an idealistic system of knowledge supported, 
and often based upon modern experimental psychology. Idealism, 
of his type, cannot be charged as being a mere vestige of an 
out-of-date, last century philosophy. He states, "I have tried 
to study the facts about ideas and reflective processes ••• n1 
1Blanshard, NOT, I, 13. See also p. 474. 
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The result is a theory often supported by the results of modern 
empirical science. 
The second major thrust of the Nature of Thought is 
metaphysical and clearly stated by Blanshard. The metaphysical 
development is neither a rebellion against the psychological 
study, nor a callous plunge into the realm of pure speculation 
and nonsense. Rather, he believes that the psychological study 
points toward and demands the metaphysical. The transition 
from the question, "What is now going on in the world, the 
world of thought in particular?", to the question, "What kind 
of reality can account for and give meaning to what is now 
going on? 11 , is, in fact, a necessary:·and inevitable transition. 
That is why the nempirical interests are gradually replaced by 
a more metaphysical interest which in the end becomes quite 
dominating.n1 uThe view we shall take of the nature of ideas 
is frankly metaphysical, and holds that psychology as commonly 
pursued is unable to deal with the problem.n2 
Preliminary Statement 
As an aid to the explanation of Blanshard's theory of 
ideas, the theory is first stated briefly and then followed by 
more detailed explanation. Ideas first arise in perception. 
Through our senses there is set before us the world of pure 
sensation. Out of this world of formless sensation the mind 
perceives nthingsn, objects, relations, and qualities. 
11.Q!Q., I, 14 • 
... 
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Sensation plus the judgment of the mind is perception.1 To 
perceive is to have ideas. Man share.s this activity with the 
higher animals. At this point ideas are tied down to what is 
presented to the mind in perception. A dog may have an idea 
of his master when the master is present, and an idea of a 
lonely situation when his master is absent, but the dog never 
has an idea of his master when the master is not present to 
his senses. Man, however, is able to entertain and generate 
ideas of things, objects, and relations which are not present 
in sense. In short, he has free ideas.2 
An idea is an event in the mind which intends and refers 
to an object •. How to conceive the relation of idea to opjeot 
tt is the perennial question for epistemology. Blanshard conceives 
of the relationship as being teleological. Idea is to object, 
what acorn is to oak tree. The idea is a partially realized 
purpose. The only thing which would bring this potentiality 
to actuality is the object itself.3 The idea, as a partially 
realized purpose, seeks two goals. The first is the goal of 
thought itself, an immanent goal, i.e., the satisfaction of the 
mind. The impulse of the mind to know, so the theory teaches, 
is a need to see things as related by logical implication, to 
see things in their necessary relations. The goal is never 
reached; each stage of satisfaction reveals a new unsatisfied 
goal. Along with this is another goal, the transcendent, i.e., 
1see Blanshard, NOT, Chapter Two. 
2~, I, 530 ff. 3Ibid, I, 473• 
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to know reality as it is, This goal is reached only when the 
potential object (idea) becomes the actual object.1 
The idea as object in potential form can, therefore, 
be and not be the object. Blanshard argues that idea and 
object must really be the same thing or else knowledge is im-
possible; yet, they must be different since we do have wrong 
ideas and we seek kno.wledge which we do not now possess. 
Perception 
The first stage of the actual.process of thought is 
perception. Perception, declares ·Blanshard, should not be 
thought of as the mere reception of the outside, as something 
that is given. The common terminology 'knowledge by acquain-
tance' errs in positing a purely passive experience at the be-
ginning of knqwledge. If such were the. case, it would be im-
possible to advance from the presented sensa to belief in 
objects.2 The very first experience is pregnant with a 
transcendental reference, otherwise one would not be able to 
experience so primitive a sensation as sheer redness. If 
sensation alone is present, one is below the perceptual level, 
below thought, and devoid of any judgment whatsoever.3 In the 
first act of perception, thought commences its journey to 
reach truth by making judgments on what is given in experience. 
Perception is that experience in which, on the warrant of 
something given in sensation at the time, we4unre-flectingly take some object to be before us. 
1~, !, 490. 
3 Ibid , I , 53 • 
2Blanshard, NOT, I, 57. 
4Ibid, I, 52. 
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It has been already noted that sensation is not per-
ception, nor to be considered as constituting, by itself., any 
level of knowledge, according to this theory, However, when 
a judgment, even though made without reflection, is added to 
it, the product is an object or relation, i.e., a distinction 
in the given sensation which was not originally present. This 
distinction is the beginning of the process of thought to 
analyze, compare an,d relate one nthingn to another until the 
goal of thought is reached. Care must be taken to interpret 
the first primitive experiences, so that escape from them is 
possible. Blanshard believes the growing acquisition of 
knowledge requires a view of primary knowledge situations 
which will permit progress in judgments through a real rela-
tionship between the primitive judgments and more advanced 
judgments. 
Blanshard provides for this progress in judgments, this 
passage to later experience, by holding that every act of per-
ception is a grasping, in differing degrees, of a universal. 
Even the child who sees 11rednessn, or hears nmiddle on is 
dealing 'in universals. It is impossible to see a particular 
thing unless it is related to a universal. Red is one color 
among many. Any perception of red as red implies an acquain-
tance with the universal, either explicit or implicit, since 
to·see red is to distinquish it as a color, and to separate it 
from every other color. uTo perceive a sound 'as' a sound, 
tl you must perceive it as 'a 1 sound, as an example of what might 
13 
be embodied in other sounds. 11 1 Growth in human knowledge, 
both on the perceptual level as well as in abstract thought, 
is the gradual improvement of the grasp of the universal. 
According to Blanshard's theory, the universal is not 
added to bare particulars at some later date, for if this were 
so, universals could never be added except in a world con-
stituting one vast, illogical illusion. The fact is, ~bare 
particularsn are arrived at through universals; the distinction 
of 'things' is a result of universals already present in the 
most primitive phase of human knowledge.2 Every perception 
comes with indications that it is a member of a larger order, 
nwith relations that carry us beyond itself. 11 3 At the very 
first stage of knowledge the teleological factor is clearly 
present, ever pointing to the goal of things in relation, 
i.e., system. 
It is impossible, Blanshard maintains, for the mind 
to know an isolated particular, devoid of all relationships. 
If such knowledge were possible it would be purely abstract 
knowledge in Blanshard's view, i.e. empty of all differentiation 
and all character. Hegel also denies the possibility of 
knowing a completely undifferentiated unity in his assertion 
that 'pure being' is a contradiction developing its own 
1~, I, 61. 
2rbid, I, 65, 66. 
3J.:tl.Q., I, 76. 
antithesis 'non-beingr.1 Some, however, currently advocate 
this very doctrine of abstraction in stating that the only 
true, unsymbolic statement we can make about God is that he 
14 
is 11being itself". 2 A statement such as this which does not 
relate God to anything cannot be called a function of thought, 
since, 11 to ~ for thought at all is to be distinct, and to be 
distinct is to be related to something else through space, 
time, degree, or otherwise."3 This fact, discovered in per-
ception, has an increasing significance in Blanshard's theory. 
Purely abstract thinking is self-contradictory, since all 
thought is a dealing with one character as it relates to 
another. The goal of thought is system. 
Another basic factor for Blanshard's theory, also found 
in perception, is the part played by inference even when thought 
is still in its infancy. Every act of perception involving a 
leap from the given to what is believed is an instance of in-
ference, a passage from the ground to a conclusion. The nature 
and justification of this advance has always troubled philo-
sophers. 
Blanshard believes that the reality of such a passage 
in the perception of things can be observed most every moment 
of our lives. An example, given by Blanshard,4 is of a man 
1G. W. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, trans. William 
Wallace (2nd ed. rev.; London: Oxford University Press, 1892), 
p. 161. 
2paul Tillioh, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 239. 
3Blanshard, NOT, I, 65. 
glancing up into the sky, there seeing a tiny cross-shaped 
object and hearing a certain pervasive hum. From this he 
draws the conclusion - 11 I perceive an airplane.n Actually 
15 
he ~s perceived very· little, yet his judgment contains a 
great deal. The tip of the eat's tail going around the corner 
is not the complete cat, but from this sensation we judge the 
presence of the cat. Each perception is a combination of the 
two factors of sensation, 'the given•, and belief, the ex-
tension of the given. Both are essential, though as the 
illustrations show, sensation may be less important than the 
ensuing belief. 
The fact of going beyond the given in all acts of per-
ception raises several interesting problems. What are the 
several-factors which justify this advance into a realm beyond 
the given? If one can sometimes see things which really are 
not there, might it be possible that the things one sees and 
believes to be really there, really are not? Also, what is 
the nature of this progress from a given sensation to what is 
taken for granted? Is the leap to be explained in terms of 
biology, psychology, mechanics, or logic? 
Blanshard rejects the view of the Behaviorists that the 
connecting link is through conditioned reflexes. 1 Also re-
jected are Hume's view of the revival of previous sensations,2 
and Stumpf's association theory.3 He argues that the advance 
1Ibid, I, 83. 
3Ibid, I, 87. 
2Ibid, I, 84-85. 
• 
:from sensation to belief' is made by a process of inference, 
though this should not be thought o:f as a syllogism or as a 
conscious progression through stated arguments. 
16 
Inference, as found in perception, explains Blanshard, 
is best called 'implicit inference', to distinguish it :from 
explicit inference, though the two kinds are really two levels 
of the same tendency o:f thought to see things as related. 
Implicit inference forms a vital :function in each perception 
by completing the :fragmentary offerings o:f sensation. One 
does not see the other side of a building when looking at it, 
and no one troubles himself as to why the architect omitted it. 
One knows it is there by virtue of implicit inference. It is 
a non-conscious activity of the mind whereby a judgment is 
made, based on something given in experience, though not 
singled out for full and specific attention.1 This character-
istic vagueness led Blanshard to call it nthe extensive limbo 
o:f the implicit.u2 
H. H. Price3 and the Gestaltists4 deny that the leap 
is made through inference. Blanshard 1 s reply is to show that 
the situation 'taken for granted' or 'believed-in'S is subject 
1 Ibid, I, 96. 
3see H. H. Price, Perception (2nd ed. rev.; London: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1950), pp. 140, 154-55· 
4see Kurt Kof:fka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), pp. 82-89. 
5This is E. S. Brightman's term and not Blanshard's. 
See E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy o:f Religion (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940), p. 347. 
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te truth and error, thus showing that it is a form of judg-
ment or inference.1 The alternative to this is that the 
'situations believed-in' are arrived at through direct appre-
hension in sense, in which case error is difficult to explain. 
Every act of perception is, therefore, composed of a 
sensation or group of sensations together with, as Blanshard 
terms it, "implicit inferencen which in turn leads to a per-
ceptual belief or a judgment about the world. Between the 
given factors and the perceptual belief there is no definite 
distinction, nno immense leap forward and no sharply marked 
stages, but a smooth continuous ripening. 11 2 Later on implicit 
inference develops into explicit inference when the mind de-
pends less and less on what is presented to the senses and 
works more and more with its own free ideas. 
-Implicit inference is so much a part of perceptual 
knowledge in Blanshard's theory, that without it, one would be 
unable to perceive nthingsn or qualities in relation to one 
another. By means of it, a judgment is made, a P.~~ief is 
formed, which alone can be called knowledge. A principle of 
such importance needs to be analyzed and explained to be sure 
words alone are not used to solve the problem of knowledge. 
Blanshard states that in every act of implicit in-
ference a tremendous wealth of :past experience and meaning is 
brought forth to shed its light on the present perception. At 
this level the process of inference is non-conscious, being 
lBlanshard, NOT, I, 99, 107. 
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out o~ the ~ield o~ one's attention. Without conscious 
attention and direction, the process o~ i~erence reaches back 
into past experience, as a lavcyer gathering evidence ~or his 
day in court, sorting out relative meanings a~d instantaneously 
applying the appropriate ones to the immediate perception. 
The lawyer has his ~iles, but where does i~erence get its 
material? Where and how is it stored up waiting to be used? 
Blanshard's reply is that this storehouse o~ meaning is not 
peripheral, ~or the more advanced and adequate are our per-
ceptions, the greater is the part of what Blanshard calls the 
meaning mass.1 In ~act, it seems to be the case that the most 
signi~icant perceptions depend less on the sensory element and 
become increasingly top-heavy with re~erence to that which 
lies beyond the given in the meaning mass. 
The behaviorists answer the question about the deposit 
o~ the past, this storehouse o~ meaning, by denying to it any 
conscious or mental quality, asserting that it is simply incip-
ient bodily movements, or a certain condition of the brain. 
Blanshard denies both of these definitions primarily due to 
their inability to explain adequately what goes on fun thought 
as one perceives by means of implicit i~erence. This area 
o~ meaning ~rom the past is used selectively under the control 
of purpose in order to produce a judgment or belief which is 
either true or false. Blanshard believes that i~ this deposit 
o~ the past operated by mechanical determination, as the 
1~, I, 160. 
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behaviorist maintain, this selectivity and the resulting judg-
ment with its truth value could not be explained. Thought is 
a purposeful process employing selectivity which forever im-
plies that mechanical explanations by themselves are below 
the level of thought.1 
Another solution, rejected by Blanshard, holds that 
the wealth of meaning in past experience persists with us in 
the present, but below the level of consciousness, in the sub-
conscious realm. This realm is not totally rejected by 
Blanshard,2 but he does feel that there are no arguments which 
prove the existence of a subconsciousness sufficiently extended 
to serve the purpose of explaining the great mass of meaning 
brought to bear on each perception.3 The subconscious has 
usually been thought of in terms of an extended field of con-
sciousness with ever diminishing intensity ad indefinitum. At 
that point where awareness of consciousness ceases, subconscious 
experience is said to begin. Here objects are so faint and 
obscure, and awareness so dim, that direct evidence for sub-
conscious experience ceases. Blanshard feels that the 
functioning of implicit inference is so detailed and precise 
that this area of diminished consciousness, the subconscious, 
is not sufficiently extended to properly account for it.4 
Furthermore, this 'meaning mass• often lies in a state of un-
conscious dormancy, rather than on the fringe of consciousness 
1see Ibid, I, 166. 
3Ibid, I, 1>'7'7. 181. 
2J.:Q.ll, I, 179. 
4Ibid, I, 18o. 
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as the case is with the subconscious. To call these submerged 
but active processes "subconscioustt in no way describes or ex-
plains them. In most acts of perception this submerged 
meaning mass can be brought into explicit consciousness. If 
the meaning mass was subconscious in essence, it could not, by 
definition, enter into explicit consciousness and yet remain 
identical to itself, i.e., subconscious. 
Blanshard sets forth his own theory with apologies for 
the sparsity of evidence, along with a challenge to the critic 
to produce a better explanation. The theory states that 
meanings reside in disposi~ions. 
These dispositions are accounted not physical but men-
tal, though they are not necessarily either conscious or 
subconscious. • • • They are the form in which we carry 
with us the results of past experience, the memories of 
events that are not at the moment being recalled, the 
meanings we hold in readiness to attach to words, the 
power to recognize things and faces. • . • • Ordinarily the 
disposition lies in a state of unconscious dormancy, but 
it mav be excited into various degrees of consciousness, 
up to the most vivid explicitness.1 
Dispositions are not entities to be dealt with after 
the method employed by physicists since dispositions are known 
only by what they do.2 Their presence is inferred from their 
activities in supplementlng perception. They are ways in which 
the mind operates and are, therefore, unique, leaving no 
possible analogy .,which might help in establishing their 
-oc• 
existence. Nevertheless, their existence is sure, for as has 
1Ibid, I, 182. 
2nll, I, 186. 
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been noted, every perception involves the reception of given 
elements nimbedded in the funded knowledge of years", 1 as a 
consequence of the nature of mind to see every given particular 
as a constituent in a system of meaning. The explicit pre-
sentation of the moment has below it "volumes of potentialities 
pressing toward actualization."2 This non-conscious realm of 
potentiality and meaning, which gives intelligibility to eve~y 
percept, is the disposition of the mind, or the make up of the 
mind at the present moment in the light of its past experience. 
The past has its life in the present exerting a push toward 
the future. 
If it is possible to relate Blanshard's 11 mindn or 
e nthoughtn with Whitehead 1 s "actual occasion"' an interesting 
comparison can be drawn between two very diverse thinkers. 
Blanshard's theory of_"dispositions" and Whitehead's ureal 
potentialityn have several oommon spheres. Both deny that the 
past can be in the present as it existed in the past. Blanshard 
denies this on the ground that .existence can occur only once, 
while Whitehead's denial is a result of his radical pluralism. 
On the other hand, the influence of the past is not only in the 
present, but a most important part of the present. The present 
is initially what it is by virtue of the past. Furthermore, 
this realm of potentiality conditions and limits future 
1Ibid, I, 526. See also I, 245. 
2Ibid, I, 527. See also I, 521. 
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oreativity.1 The nature of thought, says Blanshard, is to 
integrate the past and the present into a system. Whitehead 
agrees that the nature of an actual occasion is to integrate 
what it bas received in the light of its own immanent goal or 
purpose.2 The goal of the mind is the satisfaction of its 
immanent end, and the goal of the actual occasion is to reach 
a stage of satisfaction. Both thinkers affirm that reality is 
a process from potentiality to actuality~ guided by an immanent 
end or purpose. 
The present summary of Blanshard 1 s analysis of per-
ception is sufficient to bring to our attention four major points 
which acquire more and more significance as the total theory 
tt is developed. First, the very earliest stages of thought, i.e. 
perception, is clearly an encounter with universals.3 Olear 
· perception reflects a more adequate grasp of the universal 
than does a confused perception. Perception is never the 
grasping of an isolated thing or event, but a relating of the 
given element to other members in its specie. Most often, on 
the perceptual level, the universal is not dealt with consciously, 
yet its presence is the sine qua non of knowledge. The recog-
nition of this factor alone introduces a system of knowledge 
which has as its primary function the logical coherence of 
1Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, (New York: 
The Humanities Press, 1929) p. 101. 
2Ibid, p. 335; cf. p. 134. 
3Blanshard, NOT, I~ 567-568. 
propositions. 
Second, progress in knowledge is achieved through a 
form of inference rather than through sensory presentations 
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or physical associations in the brain. In showing that every 
belief relative to the given sensory content is a form of judg-
ment subject to truth or error, Blanshard shows that knowledge 
advances by a form of inference. Even the perceptual level 
reveals that all knowledge is linked together by logic. 
Third, perception is nat the process of receiving the 
ugiven" as a pure presentation to the mind reporting the ex-
ternal world, so much as it is the integration of universal 
meanings found in the ubank of dispositional meanings.n1 The 
peculiar characteristic of the mind is its ability to preserve 
the past in the farm of dispositions which, though mast often 
remaining an a sub-conscious level, exert a constant, and can-
trolling influence an all perceptians.2 The control of per-
ception by ideas has often been called "mind aver matter." 
Blanshard does nat deny the "givenn at any stage of perception, 
he only asserts that it is always received and supplemented 
through the instrumentality of dispositional meanings. If 
these are the facts of the mind's operation on the level of 
perception, an idealistic farm of epistemology has received 
important confirmation; confirmation coming from nan-metaphy-
sical neutral ground. 
Fourth, Blanshard's theory of perception states that 
1 Ibid, I, 216. 2Ibid, I, 203-214. 
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the nature of thought may best be understood if it is con-
ceived as a growing process moved by an immanent goal. The 
process is the striving of dispositional unconscious meanings 
to come to explicit awareness in a conscious meaning mass, 
forming a system indissolubly connected by inference. 
Blanshard feels that even perception, through dependence upon 
dispositions,_ exhibits the "potentiality-actuality" principle 
which is indispensible in the explanation of mind. 
I do not believe that in dealing with those processes 
we can dispense with conceptions which, though unknown 
to~echanism, are ~s o~d as Aristotle, the notions of 
cfu yo{~ ts and f?)..Jep (f eux. , of the potential that 
becomes the actua1.1 
Free Ideas 
After the primary stage of knowledge in perception, 
which can be abstracted into the two elements designated by 
, 
Brightman as "situations experienced:n and "situations be-
lieved inn2 a study of the nature of thought discloses a pro-
cess of the mind which goes on independent of sensory stimu-
lation and labelled, by Blanshard, as free ideas. It should 
be noted that he does not always disassociate the sensory given 
from a free idea, but asserts only that an idea which is free 
is independent of its being given in sense.3 In perception, 
certain elements not given in sense nevertheless seem to be 
present, though operating below the level of awareness. In a 
1~, I, 485. 
2 E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 347. 
3Blanshard, NOT, I, 258, footnote. 
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previous illustration, the sole sensory given quality was the 
eat's tail swishing around the corner o~ the door. The en-
suing judgment declared the presence of a cat with a full com~ 
plement of biological organs, even though no check was made of 
each organ making up a cat. The reference to a completed cat 
was implicit. With free ideas the reference becomes explicit. 
While the reference in perception is the reference of a 
divided mind, engaged partly with sensible quality and 
with its unpresented complement, in the ~ree idea the 
re~erence to the absent is normally dominant and ex-
plicit.1 
Blanshard argues that though some of the higher animals 
indicate fleeting moments when they entertain free ideas, they 
seem to be unable to develop and improve this type of exper-
~ ience beyond the very primitive level. Man's ability, however, 
to work with free ideas, distinguishes him from the animal. 
The human mind, as it faces conflicts, tends to develop free 
ideas. The conflict between ~act and perceptual expectation, 
as well as that between fact and need, forces the mind to 
bring into explicitness those ideas which previously were only 
implicit. 2 The presence of a free idea in an animal appears 
to be very short lived; whereas in man, by virtue of such 
factors as the theoretical impulse to know, success in achieve-
ment of a goal, repetition, and especially language, which 
imprisons .free ideas in a 11 ~ixed order of olassi~ioation, n 
.free ideas are retained and consolidated in his experienoe.3 
1Ibid, I, 258, c~. 528. 
3~, I, 533-545. 
2see ~' I, 528. 
Types of Ideas 
Since Blanshard conceives any and every idea as a 
partially realized purpose, 1 it is impossible sharply to 
distinguish types of ideas. All distinctions between them 
rest on their degrees of adequacy in realizing their goal, 
i.e., reality itself. Though several different kinds of 
ideas are listed, they are all explained in one theory of 
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the idea. nThere are really no types of idea at all, but 
only stages in the development of a single funotion.u 2 
Understanding this unity of all ideas, it is possible to type 
ideas as perceptual or tied ideas, free ideas, (these two are 
elementary types), and the mature stage, the general idea.3 
Perceptual or tied ideas, which have been discussed 
previously, are of three kinds. First, there are ideas which 
are arrived at through wba t Blans_hard has termed 'implioi t 
inference'. They are always present in perception though 
they never form part of the sensible content o£ the object. 
Secondly, there are ideas similar to the first in that they 
are usually grasped implicitly though it is possible here to 
discriminate the pontent o£ the idea. Time and space are ex-
amples of this type.. Thirdlu.,- any perception is· what it is 
due to a great fringe of retained experience. This retained 
experience is an idea that is present only in the form of a 
1Ibid, I, 473. 2Ibid, I, 567. 
3~, I, 566, of. 567. 
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disposition. 1 
The second major type of idea is the free idea. Its 
superiority over perceptual ideas is seen in its greater ex-
plicitness and definition, and in its greater independence of 
what is given through mhe senses. Once the free idea appears, 
it is strengthened by the desire to increase and order exper-
iences, through inference, into a system.2 If an idea proves 
successful, it is further strengthened. Above everything else, 
names for things, provided by language, advance free ideas 
and provide that anchorage which tied ideas had in sensations.3 
The third type of idea is the concept or general idea. 
Since an idea is the presence in the mind of an object 
partially realized, a study of the general idea leads to the 
object of that idea which is apparently a universal. Blanshard 
rejects what he terms the false or abstract universal in favor 
of the generic universal.4 
Blanshardts definition of the general idea brings him 
into sharp relief with other schools of thought. With the 
medieval realists, Blanshard rejects the notion that the 
general idea is an aggregate of particular impressions.5 
According to his analysis of perception, particulars are never 
dealt with in isolation from the universal. In fact, parti-
culars cannot be thought of as the ultimate bits of reality 
1see discussion by 
2IJ2ll, I, 533. 
4Ibid, I, 609. 
Blanshard, NOT, I, 522-528. 
3~, I, 538. 
5Ibid, I, 569, 602. 
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as the nominalist believes. The nominalists erred in thinking 
that a universal is the thought of a class, i.e., a set of 
objects with one or more attributes in common. They thought 
that a universe was the produc~ of subtracting all differences 
and fastening upon all identities. But the result of such a 
process is an idea that is practically empty instead of one 
giving the essence of things, declares Blanshard. 
He further argues that the abstract universal does not 
exist in the nature of things. Any attempt to subtract so-
called unessential differentia from the specie in hope of 
paring the thing down until the inner genus is exposed, is 
doomed to failure since the relation of specie to genus cannot 
be handled in such a mathematical and material manner. Neither 
does knowledge commence with an abstraction and proceed to the 
concrete. Our knowledge does proceed from the less adequate 
to the more adequate, but this does not mean having dealings 
first with an abstract universal, later bringing in its con-
crete situation. Such Platonic realism again overlooks the 
fact that specie and genus are indissolubly interrelated. 
The universal cannot be separated from its differentiations. 
Blanshard rejects universalia ante. rem, universalia 
post rem, adopting, with Aristotle, universalia_in re. As a 
result of his fundamental proposition that to know means to 
relate in a system, all forms of the abstract universal are 
rejected, even the position which holds that universals, though 
inseparable from particulars in actuality, may be separated in 
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thought. 1 
The theory states that if the goal of thought were 
reached, there would be no universals whatsoever, since a 
universal is related to particulars as potential to actua1.2 
The realization of the goal, however, is not the experience 
of man and he must continue to ·deal with the potential, with 
general ideas that have the universal as their object. The 
universal can never be set beside particulars or be conceived 
as whole to part, container to contained, but only after the 
same manner as was found to hold between tied and free ideas, 
which was not a precise demarcation, but stages in the single 
living process of the mind. The general idea, with its uni-
. versal, is a. purpose of the mind at one point in its develop-
ment which can be satisfied only by later stages of development 
when the universal gets more richly embodied with particulars, 
and things get more precisely defined and related as they are 
perceived to embody the same universal.3 It cannot be said 
that the general idea dwells in empyrean regions waiting to 
throw some light on particulars, nor on the other hand that 
particulars come before the general idea. Instead, there is 
continual interaction and mutual enrichment, whereby the 
general idea becomes fat with the content of reality and per-
ceptual ideas find their niche in the world of intelligent 
system. 
1Ibid, I, 605. 
3Ibid, I, 615. 
2~, I, 611. 
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~he object of a general idea is a universal. 
Blanshard thinks of universals as partially realized purposes 
which can be actualized only by reality itself. Universals, 
he states, are not parts of reality, but have their existence 
only in the mind in the form of a purpose to be reality.1 
Blanshard distinguishes varying degrees of development within 
the general idea by delineating the generic universal, 
qualitative universal, and the specific universal. ~he 
generic universal is defined as a purpose with reference to 
individuals. A fully realized generic universal, on this view, 
would be its alternative species.2 ~he qualitative universal 
refers to attributes and relations, e.g. whiteness or sweet-
ness. However, the generic and the qualitative universals, 
according to Blanshard, are not dissimilar since the indi-
viduals or particulars in the generic universal are reducible 
to qualities as in the qualitative universal. "~here are no 
particulars. For what gives apparent particularity to any 
character or complex is itself always universal."3 ~he 
specific universal, e.g. 'this yellow' differs with the generic 
universal only in its specificity and definitness of content. 
~he purpose of all general ideas, in Blanshard 1 s theory, 
is to approach that systematic unity which is the real world. 
Insofar as general ideas fail to encompass all of reality, ' 
they are abstractions. ~he theory states that if an idea 
1 Ibid, I, 624. 2Ibid, I, 625. 
3~, I, 631. 
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encompassed all relations of the real world, it would achieve 
the concrete universal, i.e. reality itself.1 
The general idea being the most highly evolved type 
of idea, exhibits the principles of potentiality-actuality, 
purpose and goal, process in a growing system, thereby providing 
the very best key for understanding the true nature of all 
thought and the definition of idea.2 
Rejected Definitions of Idea 
The definition of the idea and its relation to its 
object is the nprincipal problem of knowledge.n3 If the idea 
i$ declared to be identical to the object, the problem of know-
ledge is not so much solved as denied. On the other hand, 
tt Blansohard declares that if the idea is not the object in some 
form or fashion then it cannot be said that we know anything. 
The dilemma can be solved only by. some principle which is 
able to retain both positions, i.e., identity and difference. 
Blanshard rejects the leading theories. 
The older image theory correctly held to the difference 
between idea and object but failed in its description of iden-
tity. The image, its advocates said, somehow resembled the 
object as the photograph resembles the landscape. However, 
between the copy and the original there is a different order 
of existence, one mental, the other objective. Blanshard re-
jects this view since he feels it destroys true knowledge. 
1 ~' II, 517. 
3Ibid, I, 472. 
tl 
32 
He demands that idea and object be of the same order of being 
in order to account for likeness and knowledge. The image 
theory of likeness is, therefore, arbitrary and ungrounded. 
A new principle of identity must be sought.1 
Behaviorism,_ reproducing the whole problem in terms of 
bodily sets and attitudes, took the object to be a common sense 
physical object and ideas to be overt bodily reactions to these 
physical objects. When it was discovered that sometimes thought 
is present when there is no awareness of physical Objects and 
no bodily movements, the theory of "motor setsu was introduced 
which spoke of objects being potentially present when not 
actually present. 
But Blanshard rejects this in pointing to the fact that 
on the hypothesis of a purely physical world there is no room 
for the category of 'potential'. In the physical realm a 
thing is either there or it is not there. Potentiality belongs 
only in a teleological system. Though the behaviorists point 
to the truth, he feels it is illegitimate for them to do so.2 
Pragmatists correctly saw that thought was purposive 
in character, but failed to see that thought has a purpose and 
goal of its own. By defining the end of thought as the satis-
faction of a problem in doing, the pragmatists forsake thought's 
primary concern to lay bare the fixed structure of things. 
The conception of ideas as intentions to act in the future 
1~, I, 495. See also PP• 257-281. 
2Illi, I, 497. See also PP• 313-340. 
. ": ...... -.'"-
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creates problems about knowledge of past events, while the 
theory of radical empiricism with its denial that ideas may 
refer beyond experience creates the problems of solipsism and 
the isolation of the individual to his own experience.1 
The nee-realists are quite right in insisting that when 
we know an object we actually know that object and not some 
image, replica, or surrogate of it. Blanshard fully agrees 
with the neo-realist motive to come into contact with the ob-
ject of knowledge. But this contact must be so conceived that 
the relationship permits error, and a possible difference be-
tween real and imagined objects. It is at this point, however, 
that the nee-realists fail. The replacing of ideas by mental 
acts which are not to be thought of as copying or duplicating 
reality but only laying hold of it in its actual state, is the 
attempt to avoid epistemological dualism in favor of a form of 
monism. The mental act in sensory exp~rienc.e is said to be 
the effect of the object, while the mind remains passive. 
Samuel Alexander holds that the object is independent of the 
mind, while the mind is dependent on the :Object in the sense 
that the mind is the effect of the objeot.2 Every act of 
perception can be analyzed into ·the act of receiving the effect 
and the object which is the cause of the effect. 
1see ~~ I, 349-350. 
2samuel Alexander, uThe Basis of Realism," Proceedings 
of the British Academy 1913~1914, (London: Published for the 
British Academy by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, e n.d.), pp. 301-02. . 
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This theory, Blanshard feels, fails on two decisive 
counts. If the distinction between act and object can be seen 
in every perception and conception, it can also be made with 
every experience of pain and pleasure, dreams and imaginations, 
hallucination, and memory. But, if so, too many unwanted things 
appear. The physicist finds that along with electrical parti-
cles and motion he must now deal with colors, sounds, hot and 
cold, etc. The quality of pain in a toothache can be dis-
tinguished from the act of perceiving it and so must be an ob-
ject itself abroad in the world. Then too, if mind is a passive 
effect of objects, all of our thoughts are produced by reality 
itself which implies their truth without error. And again, 
since the acts of the mind are effects of objects directly 
perceived, the present mental act which has Adolph Hitler as 
its cause implies that Adolph Hitler is still our contemporary. 
The inability to deal with error and the failure to explain 
how we can think of the absent, is enough to destroy this 
theory, Blanshard believes.1 
But an even more devastating criticism is the struggle 
of neo-realists consistently to maintain their major premise, 
that when we know an object we know it directly as it is. 
Blanshard believes a closer analysis reveals that when one per-
ceives the moon there is between the physical thing and the act 
of perceiving it a long series of intermediate steps which deny 
ipso facto the claim that to know a thing is to come into 
1see Blanshard, NOT, I, 496. 
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direct engagement with it.1 
The best of the contemporary viev1s, according to 
Blanshard, is that o:fl the critical realist, which can be ac-
cepted on two of its primary affirmations with slight modifi-
cation. It asserts that the object of knowledge transcends 
experience, but the character of the object is presented 
directly in experience. The first proposition may be accepted, 
Blanshard feels, as long as it does not cast us upon the nun-
happy dil~mma between skepticism and animal faith."2 Tran-
scendence must be understood as an unreached goal toward which 
the idea (a partially realized purpose) is striving. Each ad-
vance of the idea brings the transcendent object closer to our 
experience. If we are going to speak of knowing the object 
truly, it cannot dwell forever in its transcendent realm. 
The second proposition, that the character of the ob-
ject is presented in experience directly, is criticized by 
Blanshard as being too bold in the face of the indirectness 
and shadowiness of thought. If the essence of the object is 
to be found in sense data, then we have to attribute contra-
dictory essences to the same object. If the essence is a 
meaning taken !rom the sense data, then the claim of immediacy 
is sacrificed and with it the claim to certain knowledge, 
since there is no little disagreement over just what the 
meaning actually is relative to a given object.3 
1Ibid, NOT, I, 411-414. 
3see ~' I, 495. 
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The critical realist's theory of essence, with its 
claim of immediacy, fails to do justice to the fact that some 
aspects of the process of thought seem to be subjective. 
Locke realized this and invented nsecondary qualities". If 
knowledge is the intuition of the essence of the object itself, 
one must deny that the content is mental, or that it is caused 
organically. To put it weakly, the latter is very hard to 
affirm in the light of what a dose of drugs can do to one's 
perceived essences. Yet, if the critical realist admits any 
subjective factors, he denies his major doctrine of the 
immediacy of the essence of transcendent objects. 
Santayana's realism, in denying any causal efficacy 
in the realm of essence, essences being inert and powerless1, 
destroys the usefulness and validity of thought itself. With 
this denial of the efficacy of causality in the realm of 
essences, it follows that when it is the case that B never 
occurs unless A is present, the only explanation for it is 
accident and miracle. 
Blanshard 1 s Definition of Idea 
Blanshard is convinced that though all of the above 
views present some insight into the true function of thought, 
each is deficient in its concept of the relation between the 
idea in the mind of the knower and the object he is trying to 
know. The various theories either separate idea and object to 
1George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), p. 79. 
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such an extent that it cannot be said that one knows the 
object, or the two are identified in such a way that error 
and the characteristic vagueness which is inherent to all 
thought cannot be explained. Some theories hold to both views, 
but in doing so they are manifestly contradicting themselves. 
Blanshard believes Aristotle gave the clue to conceive this 
relationship in such a manner that subject and object will be 
identical to a certain degree and at the same time different. 
This can be achieved only through the principle of potentiality-
actuality. By means of this principle, Blanshard gives the 
following definition of an idea. 
Thought in its essence is an attempt to attain, in the 
sense of achieving identity with, a spemial end of its 
own. The relationship between idea and object must be 
conceived teleologically, as the relation of that which 
is partially realized to the same thing more fully realized. 
When we say that an idea is of an object, we are saying 
· that the idea is a purpose which the object alone would 
fulfil, that it is a potentiality which this object alone 
would actualize, a content informed by an impulse to be-
come this object. Its nature is hence not fullY. intelli-
gible except in the.light of what it seeks to become. 
Mind, in taking thought, attempts to pass beyond its 
present experience to what it would be but is not yet, 
and so far as it has the thought of this end, it .~ .. ~ 
already ~ the end in posse. The idea is thus both 
identical with its object and different from it. It is 
identical in the sense in which anything that truly 
develops is identical with what it becomes. It is 
different in the sense in which any purpose partially 
realize~ is different from the same purpose realized 
wholly. 
Blanshard's entire thesis stands or falls on the 
validity of interpreting the relation of an idea to its object 
in terms of the principle of potentiality. It would seem that 
1Ibid, I, 473. 
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the principle can apply only to those things which are very 
similar in nature. Though many doubt that idea and object can 
be so closely related due to their apparent dissimilarities, 
Blanshard attempts to show that ideas and objects are both 
composed of essences. In so far as·he succeeds in this, the 
application of the principle of potentiality is appropriate, 
but if he fails to show that objects are no more than essences, 
then it would seem illegitimate to apply this principle to two 
entities which are not essentially similar. To do so in suoh 
case would do violence to their separate natureso 
Blanshard 1 s adoption of Aristotle 1 s famous notion 
leaves out significant elements. Aristotle spoke of an eternal 
characterless lfA? which inhibited the full actualization of 
form in nature. The presen·ce of eternal matter meant that at 
each level of actualization, there remained·an element of 
potentiality which forever distinguishes God, pure actuality, 
from nature. Blanshard does not accept this principle as 
eternal. Accordingly, an idea, theoretically, can be fully 
actualized, can become its object. While Aristotle was a 
dualist at this point, Blanshard is a monist. 
Two Goals of Thought 
Since an idea is a purpose attempting to realize an 
end, the next question becomes - what is this end? For 
Blanshard the end or goal is not one but two which, to be sure, 
become one in some form, when the analysis is fully completed. 
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Thought thus appears to have two ends, one immanent, 
one transcendent. On the one hand it seeks fulfilment 
in a special kind of satisfaction, the satisfaction of 
systematic vision. On the other .hand it seeks fulfil-
ment in its object.1 
The immanent end may be called the goal of the mind to 
possess truth which lies in a -system in which each component 
implies and is implied by every other.2 Such an end is the 
standard of knowledge while the transcendent end is the ob-
ject of knowledge, usually referred to as reality. Blanshard 
explains that the immanent end is derived from the transcendent 
end since the so called necessity of thought is really the 
apprehension of a necessity in the being of things.3 
As to whether these two ends are actually one, two 
answers ma~ be given, following the general thesis of Blanshard. 
First, in the long analysis the two ends are identical for the 
idea is the object. He states that nthe two aims are-
equivalent to each other,"4 and nin the long run these ends 
coincide.n5 But on the other side of the ledger Blanshard 
declares that "thought cannot swallow its object."6 Further, 
the existence of the object in a potential form, i.e., an i_dea, 
seems to be the destiny of our world. The task of philosophers 
is to understand the world but nthat we shall ever·carry it 
1ill9:,, II, 262. 
3Ibid, I, 81. See also Blanshard, rrourrent Strictures 
on Reason~hilosophical Review, LIV (July, 1945), 347, 348. 
4Ibid, I, 78. 5~, I, 488. 
~ 6Ibid, I, 472. 
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through to the end, that we shall actually succeed in .following 
the track o.f necessity across the wastes that now seem track-
less, I .find it hard to believe.n1 
Blanshard asks a major question concerning the rela-
tionship o.f these two ends. uHow is it possible that what 
satisfies these two sets o.f conditions should be the same, 
that what is demanded by the theoretic impulse should also be 
what is thrust upon us by external realit.y? '~ The answer is 
short and almost caviling. I.f such is not the case, nthere is 
no knowledge, and cadit quaestio.n3 I.f it were the case that 
the two ends actually were independent, states Blanshard, the 
present experience o.f knowledge would be a result o.f miracle, 
or one would have to deny the possibility o.f knowledge and 
adopt skepticism. Either o.f these views, however, is extreme 
and in discord with what actually occurs. 
nour own conviction is that we should take this 
immanent end o.f thought in all seriousness as the clue to the 
nature of things. 11 4 The alternative theories have nothing 
better to offer, according to Blanshard. He feels that un-
less his theory is correct, the logic o.f his opponents will 
have no true reference to the actual world, with the result 
that their arguments are in vain .from the start. If the real 
1Blanshard, Philosophical Review, LIV, 368. See also 
NOT, II, 264. 
2Blanshard, NOT, I, 491. 
3Ibid, I, 492. 4 . 6 Ibid, II, 2 3. 
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is not rational, even for the •tough-minded', then what is it? 
Where is knowledge? Where is truth? "That these processes 
are really one is the metaphysical base on which our belief 
in coherence is founded.n1 
A consideration of these two ends of thought leads to 
conclusions concerning truth and knowledge. Any consideration 
of the goal of thought brings to one 1 s mind the process of 
thought. The goal itself is only revealed through the process, 
and the process is intelligible only in the light of the goal. 
The consequence is that any analysis of thought must proceed 
under the principle of "both-andu, or as Blanshard puts it, 
realized and unrealized purpose, actuality and potentiality. 
Degrees of Truth 
Blanshard believes the immanent end of thought con-
sidered as partially realized implies the doctrine of degrees 
of truth, with coherence as both the criterion and nature of 
truth. Truth is not static, but growing. It was pointed out 
above that perfect knowledge for Blanshard means relation of 
meanings in a total system. In so far as relationships are 
not complete, in so far as ideas have not become realized in 
their objects, every proposition which may be formed and all 
groupings of these propositions will represent less than 
perfect truth. There are always further meanings and rela-
tions that compose a factor in their nature as they participate 
in reaJ.ity.2 
1rug,. 2see ~,II, 319. 
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· The conclusions reached about the nature of perception 
state that a particular cannot even be perceived without im-
plicit reference to the universal. The particular, the specie, 
in order to be known, must be related to its genus. The theory 
goes on to state that the genus itself, in order to be known, 
must be seen in the light of its relationship to a higher 
order. This process continues until every object known is 
seen in its relatedness to everything else in reality. Every 
finite judgment, therefore, contains only a degree of truth. 
It is true insofar as it properly relates one thing to 
another. It is false, in the sense of not being perfectly 
true, insofar as it omits those relations which do actually 
pertain to the thing.1 
It is often objected that this theory cannot be true 
since we know many propositions that we can see to be true 
without reserve. We know, for example, that 2+2=4. One does 
not need a graduate degree in mathematics to see this truth. 
Blanshard's reply is that the meaning or nature of any number 
involves a reference to the number system, and that it would 
not be what it is without relation .to that system. While one 
does not need to be aware of the number system, there must be 
at least implicit awareness of certain basic meanings and 
structures relative to numbers. The 2+2=4 formula is not so 
simple as it appears. An understanding of it presupposes this 
implicit reference to a number system. The formula remains 
1see ~, II, 321. 
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ntrue without reserven only so long as it is considered in its 
own limited context, i.e., considered in abstraction from the 
rest of reality. But once it is seen in the depth of its 
relations, as Blanshard conceives the internal relation of 
all meanings, it is clear that even mathematical truths are 
true only in degree.1 Mathematical truths are true without 
degree when considered in the context of mathematics, but 
this context does not exhaust their total actual relations 
in reality. 
Coherence and Truth 
Blanshard goes on to assert that the doctrine of 
degrees of truth implies coherence as the nature and 
standard of truth. That system which achieves the greatest 
satisfaction of the goal of thought through possession of the 
highest degree of truth is also the system which is most 
truthful. The test of truth for any proposition is its 
integration in the total system. For idealism, at least as 
interpreted by some of its opponents,2 this coherence with 
the system bas been defined as logical coherence or con-
sistancy with scant regard for empirical facts. Blanshard 
disagrees. 
The degree of truth of a particular proposition is to be judged in the first instance by its coherence with 
experience as a whole, ultimately by its coherence with 
that further whole, all comprehensive and fully 
1see Ibid, II, 321. 
2see George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, 
P• 59. 
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articulated, in which thought can come to rest.1 
It is not only the case that the test of truth is 
coherence, but the meaning and nature of truth is coherence, 
according to Blanshard.2 He believes that the attempt to hold 
to coherence as a test of truth, and then, perhaps, to 
correspondence as the meaning of truth is destined to fail. 
What guarantee can .be given that this coherent system has any 
real relation to reality? Since reality can never be in-
spected in isolation from our ideas of it, there is no 1;ay 
of knowing whether correspondence is present or not. If the 
nature of truth is somehow of a different nature from the 
test of truth, the two will constantly fall apart with irre-
parable harm to the claim of knowledge.3 
Blanshard further asserts that knowledge is forever 
a growing, enlarging process of system building. Each point 
in the system is.perpetually up for revision under the immanent 
end that is working through it.4 
Internal Relations and Necessity 
The immanent end of thought considered as fully realized 
is said to imply the doctrine of internal relations with the 
doctrine of necessity. The attainment of this end of thought 
is termed by Blanshard a satisfaction.5 The mind comes to 
rest, for it has apprehended everything in a system which 
1Ibid, II, 264. 2.Illi, II, 267. 
3tbidt II, 268. 4tbid, II, 429. 
5Ibid, II, 257, of. 261. 
renders everything necessary.1 Though this system has not 
actually been achieved by the mind, its reality is certain, 
declares Blanshard, since it alone would satisfy the desire 
to know.2 Blanshard here discloses his definition of 
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understanding. The thinking process seeks understanding 
which is to see things in a necessary relation. He does not 
seem to mean by this a deductive system necessarily, but any 
kind of system which relates and harmonizes discordant facts. 
When facts are seen in the context of a system,·the theoretic 
impulse comes to rest. Since, according to the doctrine of 
internal relations, all facts are related, Blanshard believes 
the theoretic impulse will not come to rest ultimately until 
it relates every possible fact in one total system. The big 
step in Blanshard's view appears to be from the assertion 
that to understand means to see things in a system, to the 
assertion that understanding can only rest in a system 
rendering all things necessary.3 
Blanshard goes on to explain, 
we hold that the ultimate object of thought, in both 
senses of the word, (j;he real world and the ideal of 
thought), is an all-inclusive system in which every-
thing is related internally to everything else.4 
Many of the relationships holding in this sometimes 
chaotic world of ours seem surely to be external. An external 
relation is one which though holding now between two objects, 
may change or even cease, and yet not change t~e essence and 
1IQ!.g,, II, 516. 
3Ibid, II, 27. 
2~, II, 24. 
4Ibid, II, 453. 
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nature of either object. "By an internal relation between two 
parts we mean a relation such that neither could be different 
without entailing a difference in the other."1 
This doctrine made popular in one form by Leibniz in 
the pre-established harmony of the universe~ and further 
elucidated by Hegel and the English absolute idealists, is the 
very essence of Blanshard's definition of the nature of thought. 
Its roots are found in the definition of intelligibility laid 
out in the first discussion of knowledge in perception. There 
it was pointed out that when an advance ocoured beyond mere 
sensation, a judgment (implicit) was made to the effect that 
such and such a sensation was a member of a universal, thereby 
related as one among many. Intelligibility means seeing things 
as related in system. 
Blansbard believes that the immanent end of thought~ 
i.e., to see all as related in a system, exerts a pressure upon 
us to believe that internal relations are not only applicable 
to the definition of intelligibility, but also to the world 
which we are trying to know.2 If reality itself is not in-
telligible, by virtue of being internally related, the immanent 
goal will be'eternally frustrated. Whatever knowledge happens 
to come along will be sheer luck. 
According to some modern theories, intelligibility 
should not be defined as one all-encompassing system, but a 
1Ibid, II, 475. 
2see Ibid, II, 261. 
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set of systems such as Lord Russell deals with. in the theory 
of types.1. Contradictions are overcome by placing each term 
of the contradiction in a separate type. Blanshard 1 s answer 
to this procedure would be that in following such a method the 
purpose is to make, in the final analysis, one intelligible 
system. The purpose of the various theories of types is to 
reduce contradictions as much as possible in the interest 
of making a system with the least amount of inconsistency. 
Even here the concept of one system of intelligibility guides 
the search. According to Blanshard, the existence of two or 
more independent realities would spell catastrophe to intelli-
gibility. Through the process of abstraction, it is possible 
to isolate a universal nat~e, and to treat it as if it were 
externally related to other natures. However, such an ab-
straoted universal nature is more or less arbitrary, never 
the essence of rea~ity which is always concrete, and always 
yields less than full intelligibility. External relations 
may apply to abstracted universal natures, but only internal 
relations can hold among concrete natures.2 
The doctrine of internal relations is further supported 
"by Blanshard ny ~ive specific arguments. First, following 
Hegel, a term may be defined via negation, or what is some-
times called the relation of difference. The sentenne, ~The 
1Bertrand Russell, nMathematical Logic as based on the 
Theory of Types", American Journal of Mathematics, XXX (1908), 
pp.. 222-262. 
2see Blanshard, N'.OT, II, 484, 486, 487. 
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4lt apple is not square' serves to define the nature of the apple 
just as truly, though perhaps not so significantly, as the 
sentence ''The apple is red'. The quality 'square' is then 
related to the apple by way of difference as red is related 
by way of identity.1 
Second, though a relation is not itself a quality, 
as Ewing correctly points out,2 a relation does give rise to 
what G. E. Moore termed a 'relational property.' Such proper-
ties are part of the nature, and a change in either would 
result in a change in the other. 
Third, if the relations are different, the term is 
different. Here the term is not the abstracted essence, but 
the concrete specific nature. In abstraction, certain re-
lations are deducted by definition, making it possible for 
the remaining universal nature to remain constant while the 
d~ducted relations change. Ooncrete natures, however, change 
with each change in relation. 
Fourth, it is sometimes argued that we have a knowledge 
of universals, even though we remain ignorant of many of 
their relations, which indicates that all relations are not 
essential for knowledge. This only proves, argues Blanshard, 
that we have some knowledge of universals, but not all 
knowledge. If we had all knowledge we would have to 
1
see Ibid, II, 476. 
2A. D. Ewing, Idealism: A Oritical Survey, (London: 
Methuen & Oo., Ltd., 1934), p. 122. 
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know every relation. Human knowledge is not yet actus purus; 
it remains in the form of a potentiality. An idea is an ab-
straction from reality giving some knowledge, but not all. 
If knowledge became fully satisfied in its goal, there would 
be no more ideas, no partial, abstract knowledge. If thought 
reached the level of internal relations, it would not be 
possible to know universals in isolation from any relation. 
Thought then sees every nature in its full concrete setting 
where every change in relation makes a change in nature. 
While in the potential realm, the realm.of abstraction, it is 
indeed possible to know in part a universal, apart from some 
of its relations; but such knowledge is not yet satisfied, 
it is still striving, still seeking to be actualized in 
reality, the concrete universal. 
Fifth, if causation means anything, it means that be-
, 
tween cause and effect there is a real relation. The appeal 
to chance, habit, or sheer unexplained .succession as revealing 
the truth of causation leads to frUstration of all thought. 
True causality according to this theory ~mplies that between 
cause and effect there exists some form of necessity. This, 
in turn, implies that cause and effect are internally related, 
i.e., a change in one would reflect a change in the other. 1 
Blanshard also feels that the doctrine of internal 
relations supports what is meant by implication in logic. He 
charges that formalists in logic, whether Aristotelian or 
1For these five points see Blanshard, NOT, Ohapter 32. 
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symbolic, interpret implication as a relation of truth-values, 
rather than a. relation of meanings. 1 He feels that material 
implication and strict implication fail to define necessity2 
due to their exclusion from necessity of the forms or meanings 
in which necessity must be embodied. Blanshard speaks of such 
logic as being extensional. When logic considers the meaning 
of propositions, he calls it intensiona1.3 The doctrine of 
the internality of all r~la.tions implies a. logic that is con-
cerned with these relations and meanings. 
Summary Statements 
The following ten points may be taken as a summation 
of Blanshard's theory of ideas. 
(1) The principle of judgment. Whenever it is appro-
priate to speak of knowledge being present, it is certain that 
a judgment has been made. Judgment, in turn, implies the pres-
ence of a universal, either explicitly or implicitly referred 
to, in every aot of thought. The principle of judgment and 
the presence of a universal reflect such an ubiquitous function 
of the nature of thought that it is seen in every level of 
knowing, including the primitive stage of perception. 
(2) Definition of knowledge. To know means to see 
things related in system. An event absolutely unrelated to 
other events is unknowable and inconceivable. Ferfect 
:Paul 
XLII 
1I!?.!E., II, 391. 
3For further use of 
Weisst "on Alternative ( 1 933J .t • 521 .. 
2Ibid, II, 386; ct. 394,397. 
these terms in this manner see 
Logics," Fhilosophical Review, 
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knowledge is a product of complete interrelatedness in which 
everything is rendered necessary. 
(3) Nature of thought and the mind. The nature of 
mind can only be grasped as it is seen as a process •. We must 
ask, what is the mind striving to become, what condition will 
satisfy its conatus? The mind is more an organism than a 
static, enduring substance. Teleology will explain more than 
psychology and physiology. 
(4) The goal of thought. As the mind is in process, 
bringing the impulse to system into more and more explicit 
• 
awareness, it progressively establishes its own immanent goal, 
the ideal of thought, i.e., satisfaction in perfect system. 
The mind also has another goal, not independent of the first, 
to see things as they are, to bring about the ndirect revelation 
in experience of what is also beyond it."1 
(5) The process of thought. Aristotle provides the 
insight in the distinction between potentiality and actuality. 
This might be labelled the principle of dualism in Blanshard 1 s 
system, though some doubt remains as to whether the previous 
point, i.e., the two ends of thought, might also lay claim to 
this attribute. If the immanent end is understood as the 
potential form of the actual transcendent end, if the ideas 
of thought are potential forms of actual things, then this 
principle is the principle of dualism with the two ends of 
thought subsumed as cases in point. At any rate this principle 
1 Blanshard·, NOT, I, 489. 
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is used by Blanshard to explain the identity and difference 
of subject and object which he feels must both be maintained 
if knowledge, mixed with error, the omnipresent experience of 
man, is to be explained. 
(6) The content of thought. An idea is a purpose in 
the mind, partially realized, which can only be satisfied by 
the object itself. An idea is a potential form of an object. 
(7) The laws of thought. Since thought and existence 
do have a connecting bridge, any treatment of logic and any 
definition of implication which omits the existential re-
ferences and meaning of propositions, is guilty of dangerous 
abstraction. Logic must be intensional. Every j.udgment that 
is necessary is about existence. The law of non-contradiction 
not only defines how terms are used, it also says something 
about the actual world in which we live; it is a statement 
of fact, be it ever so abstract. 
(8) Truth - Since thought is a process, and ideas are 
moving, growing purposes, it is better to talk of degrees of 
truth, rather than simply true or false. An idea possesses 
degrees of truth in proportion to its coherence with the total 
system. If an idea describes a relation which does hold in 
the world, the idea is, to that degree, true. It is false, 
in so far as it omits relations which do actually inhere in 
the total system. A proposition possesses truth and is 
judged true, according to its coherence in the total system. 
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(9) Principle of monism. A self contradiction arises 
if one denies the statement that there is but one system, 
according to Blanshard. If two systems were to exist, this 
could never be known. If two systems, taken to be two, were 
known to exist, they would at that moment cease to be two by 
virtue of their interrelationship in the mind of the knower. 
Two systems, would, in fact, consign the mind to a state of 
perpetual schizophrenia without the achievement of knowledge. 
Blanshard is a staunch advocate of the doctrine of internal 
relations which, he believes, guarantees and gives sense to 
man's quest for understanding. 
(10) T~e final point is a product of what might be 
termed, nrational mysticism." It opens up the .essence of 
Blanshard's system, laying bare the rationalism in which all 
intelligent men must share in some degree. Blanshard declares, 
"our own conviction is that we should take this immanent 
end of thought in all seriousness as the clue to the nature 
of things."1 
1 Ibid, II, 263. 
• 
• 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RELATION OF BRAND BLANSHARD TO LATE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY ABSOLUTE IDEALISM •. 
Whenever reference is made to Brand Blanshard in 
print, and classification is made, he is usually classified 
with the idealists. A quick glance at the index to The Nature 
of Thought suggests this alliance. Direct statements of his 
satisfaction with many of the conclusions of British absolute 
idealism are not difficult to discover. Without doubt he is 
. 
a child of Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce, and others; though 
like all children, he. has a mind of his own, and goes on his 
own way in life. The purpose of the present chapter is to 
trace the stream of Blanshard's thought up to its headwaters 
in Neo-Hegelian idealism.. The next chapter traces the journey 
o~ that stream as it confronts the maze of dams constructed 
by the realists and positivists. 
Hegel 
From Frotagoras to Kant, the struggle to find know-
ledge often became hopelessly bogged down in the problem of 
sense experience. This is especially true in Locke, Berkeley, 
Hume, and to some extent in Kant. In the heat and obscurity 
of this epistemological debate, the problem of a form of 
54 
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knowledge higher than that of perception tended to be ne-
glected. It was Hegel, especially, who argued that Kant's 
concept of a 'thing in itself' is utter abstraction and total 
emptiness, a product of "the empty 'ego' which makes an object 
out of this empty self-identity of its own.u1 Hegel believes 
Kant did valuable service in showing that cognitions of under-
standing founded merely upon experience are to be classified 
as appearance. Kant failed, however, to show the true rela-
tionship between the content of the understanding and the thing 
in itself. Hegel believes he solves the problem with the 
absolute idea, 11 the absolute unity of the notion and objec-
tivity.n2 The idea, as a process,3 runs through three stages 
in its development. The first form of the idea is the idea of 
1ife, i.e. the form of immediacy; the second form is knowledge, 
i.e. the form of mediation or differentiation; and the third 
form of the idea is the absolute idea.4 
The Absolute Idea is, in the first place, the unity of the 
theoretical and practical idea, and thus at the same time 
the unity of the idea of life with the idea of cognition ••• 
The unity and truth of these two is the Absolute Idea, 
which is both in itself and for itself.5 
This synthesis, to use the Hegelian term, of the form and 
content of knowledge in the universal experience, the absolute, 
is the basic insight of absolute idealism. Blanshard follows 
in this general tradition. 
1G. \v. F. Hegel, The Losic of Hesel, trans. William 
Wallace (2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1892)' p. 92. 
2Ibid _, p. 352. 3Ibid, p. 357. 
4Ibid, p. 358. 5Ibid, p. 374. 
• 
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Aside from the appeal made to Hegel's argument for 
internal relations by the relation of difference, Blanshard 
expresses no debt to Hegel. In fact, in several places he 
derides Hegel for his profound confusion of words, calling the 
famous two volume Logic, rrtwo powerful.but dark barbarities. 111 
Not once does Blanshard admit 11 the Absoluten, so important to 
every phase of Hegel's thought, into his system. This is not 
to say that Blanshard has no absolute, only that he does not 
utilize this term, so important to Hegel and his followers, in 
explaining the nature of thought. The impression is given that 
Blanshard makes a special point of not being identified w:tth 
Hegel. 
Though Blanshard does not acknowledge it explicitly, 
his point of view is much the same as Hegel's in many ways. 
He shares with Hegel the doubt that empiricism can give ulti-
mate knowledge about reality. Both assert that sense perception 
is not the proper method to apprehend facts.2 Both also 
criticize empirical knowledge for its failure to produce 
necessity.3 
Blanshard's doctrine of the immanent end and the· 
transcendent end of thought is also found in Hegel, though not 
in these terms. Hegel speaks of the ,craving of reason after 
1 
. Blanshard, NOT, II, 35. 
2 F. Hegel, The Logic of Hesel, 79. See G. W. p. 
Cf. Blanshard, NOT, I, 380, 3th. 
3see G • w. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, p. 15. 
Cf. Blanshard, NOT, Chapter 28. 
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• ~nowledge. 11 1 This desire for knowledge is satisfied only when 
I 
I 
~erfect system is attained, when all things are brought into 
I 
necessary relationship. Blanshard 1 s teaching that when the 
i 
immanent end of thought is reached, the transcendent end is 
J1so, since they coincide, is another way of expressing 
I 
*egel 1 s doctrine that nthe Idea is truth in itself and for 
itself, - the absolute unity of the notion ~ubjectivity] 
i $.nd objectivity."2 Blanshard 1 s assertion that the two ends 
i 
~f thought are identical appears to have much in common with 
fegel 1 s comment that rr"ti'hat is rational is actual and what is 
~ctual is rational."3 
I 
I 
One of the most distinguishing, as well as important, 
poncepts in the Hegelian philosophy is dialectical process. 
~hough it is debatable whether this process is simply logical, 
I 
I 
pr whether it is temporal and existential, in Hegel, the fact 
lt-emains that he believed our world to be a process,4 a 
I ~evelopment, perhaps even a living organism. English and 
~erican absolute idealist such as Bradley, Bosanquet, and 
royce do seem to follow Hegel on this point, yet none of them 
~akes any use of or holds in esteem the formal ~chinery 
lof the dialectic.5. Though rejecting a ladder of-triads, the 
I 
1 G. W. F .. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, p.231. 
2 
' ll?.!.Q., p. 352. 
I 3G. W. F ~ Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, tr. ··by 
!T· M Knox (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1942), ·p. 10. 
I 4G. W. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, p. 357. 
! 5G. Watts Cunningham, "English and American Absolute 
!Idealism, n A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergilius 
iFerm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 319. 
• underlying ··principle of the dialectic, i.e. process toward 
unity, does seem to be present in some form. 
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Brand Blanshard1 s form of the dialectic is Aristotle's 
ancient doctrine of actuality-potentiality. Its primary 
function is to explain the relation of idea to object. 
Individual ideas become not so much fragments of the whole, 
as a potential form of the whole. To use figures of speech, 
the individual or particular is not related to the whole as 
so many pieces of a jig-saw puzzle to the puzzle completed, 
but as a seed to a full grown plant. However, contrary to 
Hegel, this type of process is not through the struggle of 
opposites. The advance is smooth and regular as the idea 
becomes enlarged and satisfied under the inner push of the 
immanent goal of the mind, and the outer pull of reality.1 
Ideas, according to Blanshard are purposes which have reality 
as their goal; but in themselves they are not reality, only 
potential forms of reality.2 The presentative realists deny 
epistemic development by saying that reality is a point to 
which we need not travel, since it is already present in sense 
awareness. The dualist, who adopts the correspondence 
criterion for truth, also denies development of an idea 
towards the object since this type of dualism cuts off any 
possible criterion of what is or is not an advance toward 
knowing reality. By introducing Aristotle • s notion o·f 
potentiality into the discussion on ideas and objects, the 
1 Blanshard, NOT, I, 483. 
• strong points of both realism and dualism can be consistently 
retained by Blanshard while their weaknesses are avoided. If 
the idea became fully actualized it would be the object, 
declares Blanshard; therefore, when we know, we know reality. 1 
However, since potentiality (the idea) is always less than the 
actual, the consequent is that knowledge is partial and often 
false .. 2 
Blanshard develops his thought in language which differs 
greatly from Hegel. Schneider, in discussing the recent de-
velopments in idealism states that 11 the emphasis on mind as 
objective logical structure has grown at the expense of the 
Absolute.n3 This is true of Blanshard. The Nature of Thought 
is of little service to theism, nor does it offer an absolute 
that can be used for religious purposes. No attempt is made 
to give an apologetic for the Christian doctrine of God, or, 
for that matter, is Blanshard.concerned to make idealism itself 
an issue. Gone, also, is the empyrean language, the mystical 
communication with the Absolute, the influence of Indian 
thought, and relapses into "milky mysticism."4 Mrs. Eddy 
. . 
may have purloined from Hegel,5 but if she were alive to 
read Blanshard, surely she would think him too rationalistic, 
(New 
2Ibid, II, 304. 
3Herbert W. Schneider, History of American Philosophy 
York: Columb~a University Press, 1946), p. 492. 
4Blanshard, NOT, II, 517. 
5This charge is made in a book by Walter Haushalter, 
Mrs. Eddy Purloins from Hegel (Boston: Beauchamp, 1936). 
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academic; and perhaps too simple at the expense of the 
absolute. :Perhaps the analytic writing of G. E. Moore, Cook 
Wilson, and the early Russell have delivered Blanshard from 
this type of amalgamation of philosophy, politics, religion, 
and poetry. 
Bradley, Bosanquet, and Royce have all contributed 
to the general point of view expressed by Blanshard. Though 
often classified as Neo-Hegelians, this designat~on oan be 
applied to these men only with important reservations. If 
it is a moot question what they severally owe to Hegel, such 
is not the case concerning what Blanshard owes to them. Their 
influence is clearly seen in many of the major points of 
Blanshard's system. Blanshard, of course, has his own im-
portant reservations, as well as his own distinctive contri-
butions; yet the unmistakable imprint of the Nineteenth Century 
absolute idealists is clearly present. 
Perception 
Blanshard•s theory of perception involves two very 
important issues. First, no real perception is present where 
there is no judgment; or, positively, whatever is a true act 
of knowledge is by definition an act of judgment.1 Second, 
in perception, one does not deal with particular, atomic 
entities but with universals.2 
In support of this view, Blanshard appeals to Bradley's 
argument that the process of thought is the application of a 
1Blanshard, NOT, I, 112. 
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"what" to a "that", the attribution of an idea to an existent. 
A subject (the existent) is judged to possess a predicate (the 
idea). "If there is no judgment, there is no thought,«1 
declares Bradley. Bosanquet is also called in to support this 
view.2 Blanshard's argument for the significance of universals 
in the beginning stages of thought, appeals for support to 
Bradley again in that 11 from the outset universals are used. 1f3 
Definition of Idea 
Though the application of the Aristotelian formula of 
potentiality=actuality to the relation of an idea to its ob-
ject appears to be original with Blanshard, his definition of 
an idea as a purpose4 is found in Josiah Royce. He states that 
e an idea is ffany state of consciousness, whether simple or com-
ple~, which, when present, is then and there viewed as at 
least a partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious 
purpose.u5 Royce goes on to state that the purpose embodied 
in the idea is the internal meaning of the idea.6 These pur-
poses form systems, the ultimate system transforming itself 
into reality. The absolute in Royce and the transcendent end 
in Blanshard bring satisfaction to the purposes or ideas. 
York: 
1 F. H. Bradley, ApSearance and Reality (2nd ed.; New. 
The Macmillan Co., 1 79), p. 170. 
2Blanshard, NOT, I, 115. 
3Ibid, I, 92. Cited from Bradleyts Logic, I, 36-8. 
4Ibid, I, 473, 486. 
5Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New York:The 
Macmillan Company, 1901~)~,~p~p~.~2~2~-~2~3~.~~S~e~e~a~l~s~o~B~l~an=shard, NOT, 
I, 51 9. 
6Ibid, p. 25. 
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Over against the internal meaning of an idea, Royce 
places the external meaning which is 11 that reference peyond 
themselves to objects, that cognitive relation to outer facts."1 
However, this is not correspondence since the only way of 
knowing the external meaning, is by lfappeal to the truth, i.e. 
to the adequate expression and development of the internal 
meaning of the idea itself.n2 Blanshard follows when he 
states that fulfilment of the immanent end brings also the 
fulfilment of the transcendent end, since the inner impulse 
to know, along with the coherence of our ideas is the clue 
to knowing reality itself.3 
Two Goals of Thought 
The two ends of thought, immanent and transcendent, 
are expressed by Bradley in the terms Uthe primitive felt 
whole u and the "Other. n4 The 11 other" is not reached until 
the drive for unity and system is reached, at which point 
thought commits its 11 happy suicide1'1 • Blanshard also affirms 
that the idea ceases to be when it becomes fully actualized, 
i.e., becomes the object itselfe Any stage below the absolute 
or the actualization of the goal is characterized by the two 
ends, a divis.ion between the subject and the predicate, 
between reality as potential and actual. 
1 Ebid, p. 26. 
3Blanshard, NOT, I, 488, of. II, 263. 
4F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (2nd ed.; 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1879), p. 182. 
Losic and Reality 
In the areas of the nature of judgment and logic, 
Blanshard shows no significant variation from Bradley and 
Bosanquet. Due to the rise to popularity of symbolic ex-
tensional logic in the past thirty years, Blanshard comes 
forth as an apologist for the older views ldf Bradley and 
Bosanquet, but actually adds very little content. Bradley 
laid the foundation when he wrote, 
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The object of metaphysics is to find a general view 
which will satisfy the intellect, and I have assumed that 
whatever succeeds in doing this is real and true, and 
that whatever fails is neither.1 
G. Watts Cunningham points out that Bradley here makes 
two assertions about reality; namely, that whatever satisfies 
the in~ellect is real as well as true.2 Absolute idealists 
hold that the assertions are inseparable, since every judgment 
of the intellect is a statement about reality itself. Bradley 
states, "judgment adds an adjective to reality. 11 3 Bosanquet 
holds that nevery judgment, perceptive or universal, might 
without altering its meaning be introduced by some such phrase 
as 'Reality is such that-,• 'The real world is characterized 
by-.'"4 Thus, through a subtle monism, the dualistic problem 
of the relation of an idea to its object is solved. The 
judgments of the mind, according to the degree of their co-
herence, are taken as revelations of reality itself. 
1 Ibid, p. 491. 
-2~. Watts Cunningham, 11English and American Absolute 
Idealism, Hi·story of Philosophical Systems (New York: The 
Philosophical Library, 1950) 1 p. 32o. 
3Ibid, p. 144. 4cited by Cunningham, Ibid, p.321. 
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Brand Blanshard not only accepts Bradley's first con-
viction that what satisfies the intellect is true, an assertion 
which numerous opponents of absolute idealism might accept, 
but is also in whole hearted agreement with the second 
assertion, that whatever satisfies the intellect is real. 
This is full grown absolute idealism. Blanshard accepts the 
conviction without any significant modification of Bradley 
or Bosanquet. It becomes one of the chief pillars in his 
system.. It is introduced to explain perception, the nature 
of an idea, and especially as an argument against what he calls 
extensional logic which relegates necessity to a logical form 
created by human convention. 
While the end or aim of thought is truth, it is also 
understanding, declares Blanshard. If one knows the truth of 
something, one also has an understanding of it. Truth and 
understanding are products of system, a system which is ulti-
mately one.1 The fact of this one system implies that truth 
describes reality and our understanding is of reality.2 
Bradley's phrase "satisfy the intellect," is often 
found in The Nature of Thougnt.3 It refers to the tendency 
of the mind to seek necessary logical connection between the 
judgments which it makes. This hunger for necessity is satis-
fied by the immanent goal of thought. For Blanshard, this 
satisfaction, even though only partially achieved, is the 
1Blanshard, NOT, I, 78, 80. 
2Ibid, I, 78. 3Ibid, II, 257, 261, 262. 
only possible criterion one has for determining the presence 
of the real in our knowledge. 1 Hoernlef calls this kind of 
logic "Reali ty-as-i t-is-perceived-and-thought. rr2 Absolute 
idealists feel the only alternative to this is to fall back 
on some immediate presented fact, a •given', which is taken 
as reality. 
Furthermore, this conviction that what satisfies the 
intellect is also real, leads Blanshard to make two assertions 
quite contrary to much of modern logic. A priori statements, 
not being sheer human c~nvention devoid of empirical meaning-
fulness, must be taken intensively, i.e., with reference to 
reality.3 Logical necessity, which the logician seeks, holds 
among things as well as among ideas. Hypothetical judgments 
(P~Q) affirm something of reality and depend for their truth 
or falsity on some condition in the actual world, not on pure 
logical forms themselves.4 Ideas in the mind, whether those 
gained from perception or those of logic, are in some way 
reality itself. Deny this, Blansbard affirms, and you deny 
yourself any ground for knowledge about the real. Blanshard 
believes that the justification of coherence as a test and 
1 Ibid, II, 448. 
-
2Reinhold Fredrich Alfred Hoernl/, Studies in Philo-
sophy, ed. Daniel s. Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1~52)~ p. 32. Df. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 
p. 127: 1Sent.ient experience, in short, is reality, and what 
is not tlais is not real." 
3Blanshard, NOT, .II, 419, cf.423. 
4Ibid, II, 421, 426. 
4t definition of truth rests on the meta~hysical base that the 
two processes, namely satisfaction of the intellect and 
apprehension of the real, are really one.1 
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Blanshard1 s term for reality~as-it-is or the 'absolute' 
is "transcendent end. 11 The term, "transcendent end, It of 
course, is intelligible only when it is linked to the pro-
cess of thought. When thought becomes satisfied, it is said 
to have .reached its immanent end o.r goal; it has achieved a 
necessary system. The immanent and transcendent ends are so 
.related that when the immanent end is attained, the transcendent 
end is also, since the two ends in the long .run coincide.2 
With the attainment of the transcendent end, Blansha.rd be-
lieves reality itself is app.rehended.3 The nature of .reality 
is .revealed in the nature of thought. Blanshard here follows 
Bradley and Bosanquet in the idealistic conviction that the 
.real must be conceived in terms of thought. Or, as Hegel put 
it, the .real is .rational. Kant laid the foundation in saying 
that the world we know is a construct patterned by the forms 
of the mind. Blansha.rd's assurance that thought does actually 
reveal reality as it .really is, .rests on his definition of 
ideas as reality itself existing in potential fo.rm.4 With 
this form of monism, he asserts that .reality is what one 
would have if one's present thought was developed fully into 
11.£1.Sb II, 263. 
2Brand Blansha.rd, NOT, I, 488, Also, II, 516. 
3 1 4 . 18 ~, II, 5 7. ~~ II, 5 • 
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a comprehensive~ deductive system. This completed system, 
from the point of view of thought, is called the immanent 
end, while from the viewpoint of objective reality it is 
called the transcendent end. 
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Metz points out that the two main points of Bradley's 
metaphysics are 1) the distinction between reality and its 
appearances, and 2) the conception of the universe as a whole, 
not f~agm.entarily.1 The same can be said of Blanshard. In-
stead of using the terms "appearancen and "reality,u he speaks 
of the ''potential" and 11 actual.n On the second point above, 
Blanshard forever insists that knowledge demands system. He 
severely condemns all logicians who define implication as 
holding between two abst.ractions.2 Indeed, knowledge.of any 
kind implies inclusion of what appeared to be an isolated 
event or object into a system. Perfect knowledge, according 
to Blansha.rd, holds only in an all inclusive system where one 
can go from any one judgment to all of the others.3 "Abstract 
thinking, in the sense of dealing with any character quite 
alone and apart is not only an impossibility; it is a self-
contradiction.rr4 
The Absolute 
It should be noted, however, that Blanshard does not 
. 1Rudolf Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), pp. 335, 336. 
, 
2Blanshard, NOT, II, 434. 
3Ibid, II, 264. 
.. -., ., 
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speak of the unitary view of reality as being that of an ab-
solute mind. On this point he does not follow Royce, Bosanquet, 
or Bradley. Royce defended the position that the absolute 
was a·single mind. uThere is, then, at last, but one Self, 
organically, reflectively, consciously inclusive of all the 
selves, and so of all truth.n1 Bosanquet argues that the neo-
realists fail due to their neglect to inquire into the con-
dition of self-existence.2 The nature of being a world or a 
whole is in the condition of self-existence. This is found 
in mind which is always a world. Physical means abstraction 
from mind. Bradley has difficulty in explaining just what the 
nature of the absolute is, though he does seem to indicate that 
it is some form of experience, though devoid of all relations 
and of all objects of awareness. It is neither will nor 
intelligence, nor can it be described by any qualities of 
appearance. Bradleyts absolute does, however, contain all 
appearances in itself in one total undivided experience.3 
While Blanshard is very careful to point out the manner 
in which total reality is to be defined, he does not attempt 
any serious definition beyond the fact that reality, in all 
probability, is a perfect system of internal relations. The 
definition of reality must be restricted to the implications 
1Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1892), p. 377. 
2Bernard Bosanquet, The Distinction between Mind and 
Its Ob,lects (Manchester: At the University Press, 1913), p.38. 
3F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 463. 
which are found in the process of thought itself, Blanshard 
feels~ He does not call it "the Absoluten, nor amind, nor 
a super-conscious experience, nor God, nor any of the other 
possible titles which have been used. He seems satisfied to 
go along with a defir.mi:tion given by Caird: uwe cannot play 
the game of thought, if one might use such an expression, 
without taking our stand upon the idea that the world is a 
self-consistent and intelligible whole. 11 1 
Bradley's Absolute m~y be contrasted with Blanshard's 
real. Blanshard does not have such extreme bifurcation as 
'appearance and reality.' While-Bradley is intent on drawing 
every conceivable object into the dialectical vortex, thereby 
disclosing its nature to be that of appearance, over against 
reality, Blanshard_attempts to show a progressive connection 
of all things with reality, teaching only that they are the 
saplings of reality, not the full grown tree. For him it is 
not appearance/reality, but potential/actual; not a set of re-
lations contrasted to a non-relational absolute, but one long 
continuous set of relations which have their beginning in ab-
straction and their end in the concrete universal. Blanshard 
speaks in terms of growth and realization, rather than division, 
as in Bradley. There is no 'great gulf fixed' between present 
1 Edward Caird, uidealism and the Theory of Knowledge 11 , 
Proceedings of the British Academy, 1903-1904 (London: -
Published for British Academy by Henry.Frowde, Oxford University 
Press Warehouse, 1905), p. 102. 
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knowledge and the comprehension of reality as it is.1 
According to Bradley, human thought is relational, 
i.e., the application of a 11thisrr to a "that11 • The Absolute, 
however, can never be conceived in such terms since this 
dualism of 11 this 11 and "that 11 breaks down .the unity which is 
the essential characteristic of the Absolute. Since "relation" 
is a quality of appearance, and appearance as such is not to 
be identified with the Absolute~2 the Absolute can not have 
relations. Blanshard, on the other hand, forever talks about 
reality as a system, with internal relations which yield 
necessary connections among all possible judgments making up 
reality itself. Reality is a system which produces unique-
ness and individuality by exhausting all relations. The whole, 
for Blanshard, being continuous with the partial system which 
we now possess in thought, does not dissolve relations, but 
completes and fulfils them. 
And thus we find that uniqueness, individuality,3 far 
from being a foreign country, is itself the very goal of 
thought. It is the point at which the reali~ation of the 
immanent end overtakes the transcendent end. 
1 Blanshard,. NOT, I, 481-483~ The process of thought 
is ''essentially a coming to be on the part of that which is 
not.yet actual, in which the form of what emerges controls 
the course of its own emergence.'' p. 483. 
2F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 430. "All 
is appearance, and no a:r.pearance, nor any combination of these, 
is the same as reality. 1 
3'Individualityi here does not mean an independent 
particular but a set of complex relations. Bee NOT, I, 605, 
cf. 651 • 
4Blanshard, NOT, I, 505. 
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By connecting present appearance with reality-as-it-
is through the concept of unrealized to realized purpose, 
Blanshard avoids the separation which appears in Bradley. 
Blanshard has an ingenuous explanation of the relationship 
between appearance and reality in the concept of potentiality-
actuality. Instead of calling in an absolute to save finite 
experience from self destruction due to its contradictions~ 
Blanshard 1 s theory calls for constant enlargement of our 
present system of relations which, when completed, will bring 
fulfilment of both the immanent end and the transcendent end 
of thought, 
This continuity between present knowledge (the potential) 
and complete knowledge of the real (the actual) strengthens 
Blanshard1 s defense of degrees of truth and coherence as a 
test and definition of truth, Since ultimate reality itself 
is conceived as a system of universals, our finite system may 
be considered as being of the same kind1 only less fully de-
veloped. His emphasis on the continuity of the potential with 
the actual, provides a better environment in which a theory 
of degrees of truth can operate~ Potentiality, as it realizes 
its inner purpose, does become more like actuality, whereas 
in Bradley, appearance is always relational, while the ab-
solute is non-relational. 
Though Blanshard conceives of total experience in a 
different way then Bradley and Royce, he shares with them, 
-41a and with all absolute idealists, the conviction that our 
present experience inevitably leads to and depends upon the 
"spirit of the whole", the positive and constructive prin-
ciple of non-contradiction, upon the concrete universal. 
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This is the foundation doctrine in all forms of absolute 
idealism. Hegel, after describing the first two abstract 
forms of the idea, i.e. the forms of immediacy and mediation, 
says of the absolute idea, 
its true content is only the whole system of which we 
have been hitherto studying the development. It may be 
also said in this strain that the absolute idea is the 
universal, but the universal not merely as an abstract 
form to which the particular content is a stranger, but 
as the absolute form, into which all the categories, the 
whole fullness of the content it has given being to, 
have retired. 1 
Blanshard • s whole point of. view also rests on the concrete 
tl universal. The ideal of understanding is to apprehend some-
thing in a system which renders it necessary.2 This system 
is not only in the mind, but also in the real world. Blanshard 
states that, 
it seems clear that, left to itself, the theoretic im-
pulse cannot rest while anything in the universe is out-
side the web of necessity. Thought is the movement of 
experience toward a special type of completeness; it is 
the pursuit of intellectual integrity; and so long as the 
field of experience remains a litter of dis .lecta membra, 
such integrity is still to be achieved.3 
What we are thus committed to examine, by ~he very term~ 
of our theory, is the universal as it exists in nature.4 
1 G. W. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, p. 375. 
2Blanshard, NOT, II~ 24. 
3Ibid, I, 654. 
4Ibid, I, 591. 
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Conclusions 
In conclusion, the relationship of Brand Blanshard's 
philosophy to that of Bradley, Bosanquet and other absolute 
idealists can best be explained perhaps, ·in terms of Blanshardls 
own theory of the potential which strives to become actual. 
While Blanshard is in the same tradition, he has enlarged, 
improved, and enriched the viewpoint by relating the basic in-
sights of absolute idealism to contemporary opposing theories. 
Blanshard·' a thought is definitely a resurrection, if indeed 
the first born ever really died. The changes which he intro-
duces serve to purify, remodel, clarify, and support the.basic 
insights of British absolute idealism, not to alter its nature. 
Blanshard says much less about numerous metaphysical 
issues than his predecessors. After stating that he believes 
reality to be a single, complete system, he refrains from 
making further definitions. He says nothing about the meta-
physical status of personality; he does not explain the place 
of ethical, religious, or aesthetic values in the system, nor 
does he develop any social theory, even with respect to human 
knowledge and language. Though perhaps some of these issues 
fall outside the province of a work on the nature of thought, 
one still wished to know more about the status of the human 
subject to himself, to others, and to reality itself. These 
seem to be deeply involved in the whole question of knowledge. 
Bradley, at least, faced these issues squarely. 
The major advance over his predecessors is in the 
·-· 
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conception of the identity of subject and object in terms of 
potentiality-actuality. Blanshard contends that a better uni-
fication of metaphysical monism and epistemic duali-sm is 
achieved by conceiving the knowledge situation through con-
cepts such as growth, fulfilment of purpose, and realized end. 
By adopting Aristotle's notion of potentiality-actuality, 
Blanshard hopes to show that the only way to overcome the 
obvious dualism which exists between the states of one's 
awareness and the objective reference of those states, is to 
show that they are actually identical, at least in the sense 
that the seed is identical to the full grown plant. The 
opponents of idealism have always tormented their foe by 
asking for the locus of error in a system where idea and 
object are one. The explanations of Bradley and Bosanquet, 
which attempted to introduce some kind of difference into the 
monism by an appeal to a limited, finite, and partial point 
of view, seemed not to satisfy the ears of the opposition. 
Blanshard believes that if the ulimited, finite, and partia::t 
points of view 11 taught by the older idealists are interpreted 
in the potentiality-actuality context, all will become clear. 
In so doing, he is attempting to take a major point of his 
predecessors, change its environment, in the hope that it 
will become a respected member of the philosophic community. 
The final chapter of this thesis raises a question 
about the appropriateness of applying the potentiality-
tit- actuality principle to ideas and their objects. The question 
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-e is whether idea and object are so related in fact that when 
they are placed in the context of the potential which becomes 
actual, their real nature will not be distorted. 
•• 
.e 
OHA.PTER THREE 
BLANSHARD --AN APOLOGIST FOR IDEALISM 
If a philosopher proposes to restore large blocks of 
<.. 
Bradley and Bosanquet, it should be done with the amendments 
that later criticisms have rendered necessary. The older ab-
solute idealism has for varied and sundry reasons been under 
heavy fire since the turn of the century. Some objections to 
idealism have stemmed from recent studies in logic and other 
philosophical disciplines, while others are based upon tempera-
mental bias, often unexpressed, though frankly stated in the 
case of William James. 
The 'through-and-through' universe seems to suffocate me 
with its infallible impeccable all-pervasiveness. Its 
necessity, with no possibilities; its relations, with no 
subjects, make me feel as if I had entered into a con-
tract with no reserved rights, or rather as if I had to 
live in a large seaside boarding-house with no private 
·bedroom in which I might take refuge from the society 
of the place •••• Oertainly, to my personal knowledge, 
all Hegelians are not prigs, but I somehow feel as if all 
prigs ought to end, if developed, by becoming Hegelians.1 
Realism of the British and American schools waged an 
all-out war against the subjectivism of the idealists which 
reached its most salient victory in the 11 Refutation of Idealism" 
by G. E. Moore published in 1903. This frontal assault was 
then followed by the coup de grice of the critical realists 
1oited by Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy of the Twentieth 
Oentury, "Twentieth Oentury Philosophy:;, ed. Dagobert D. Runes, 
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 231. 
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and the positivists. Blanshard has carefully considered the 
arguments of these opponents, but is far from dazzled by their 
attacks. The fact is, he feels that relatively little revision 
is needed since the arguments, by their own intrinsic weak-
nesses, show that Bradley and Bosanquet were on the right 
track in their efforts to solve the problem of the relation 
of subject and object in the experience of knowing. Of all 
the opposing views, Blanshard thinks that of the critical 
realist is the most plausible and convincingly defended. Yet 
he goes on to say that "the metaphysicians of objective idealism 
had gone beyond critical realism before it was born."1 
The scope of this thesis does not encompass a point by 
point analysis of similarities and differences between Blanshard 
and many assailants of idealism, though it is concerned with 
those arguments which ostensibly made idealism a lost cause for 
a contemporary philosopher. Accordingly, the following para-
graphs present types of arguments which led to the downfall of 
idealism as "then philosophy, along with replies which Blanshard 
makes against them. His usual procedure is to show that the 
theories of his opponents are internally inconsistent and in-
adequate in light of the ·facts. 
English and American Nee-Realism 
The Oharge of Subjectivism 
The English and American nee-realists set out to destroy 
.......... _:. 
1Brand Blanshard, NOT, I, 444. 
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the subjectivism of the prevalent idealism. Mentalism and imma-
terialism, old and frequent visitors to the theory of knowledge, 
were suspected as enemies of common sense and the new interests 
in science. The subjectivist principle that all we ever know 
are ideas which are in the mind, along with its metaphysical 
corollary that ~ if percipi, produced a movement of revolt 
called nee-realism. Montague says 
the internal contradictions of each variety of this third 
theory ri.e., epistemological idealism or subjectivism] 
the manrfold difficulties in the way of reconciling any 
form of it with the procedur~ of common sense and of 
science, and, finally, the pathetic dependence of con-
sciousness upon the very objects which it is supposed to 
create- have brought about the realistic revolt.1 
Th.e great error of the idealists, so the realists main-
tain, is their insistence that the cognitive situation is ex-
clusively one which manifests a relation between mind and its 
object. To identify the content and the object of knowledge 
by assimilating the object to the content, is to fail to make 
the essential distinction between the object perceived and the 
act of perceiving it, declare the realists. Further, perception 
does not constitute the object since nbeing known is something 
that happens to a pre-existing thing.u2 The universe, according 
to the realists, is not a single logical or moral entity as 
the idealists affirm, but a combination of several spheres. 
Reality is not one system, says Perry, but many.3 The truth, 
1Edwin B. Holt, et.al, The New Realism (New York: The 
Macmillan Oompany, 1912), pp. 251-252. (Montague). 
4lt 2~, p. 34. 
York: 
3Ralph Barton Perry, The A~Sroach to Philosophy (New 
Oharles Scribner's Sons, 19 ), pp. 419-420. 
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he holds, lies in pluralism over against metaphysical abso-
lutism. ni.f cognition is not the universal condition of being, ,. 
then cognition must take its place within being, on the same 
plane as space, or number, or physical nature.ul Thus, sub-
jectivism is reduced to one aspect of reality; it is no longer 
the constitutive principle o.f objects, say the realists. 
Over against this denial o.f the univensality of subjecti-
vism the realists affirm that objects of the real world are 
brought directly into the awareness of the mind, without ideas, 
images, or copies. "Merely to have a sensation is already to 
be outside that circle.n2 Moore goes on to say, "I am directly 
aware of the existence of material things in space as of my own 
sensations.n3 The less radical English nee-realists give to 
mind a status of its own, though still affirming the independence 
of the object and its direct awareness in consciousness. M0ore 
admits being confused on this issue by holding that we are 
directly aware of independent objects (i.e., objects whose 
~ is not percipi) on the one hand, and that, at least .for 
sense-data (e.g. the sensible quality- "blueu), their~ is 
percipi, on the other.4 
The American nee-realists discount the contribution of 
1Edwin ~. Holt, et al, The New Realism, p.33. (Introduc-
tion) 
2G. E. Moore, "Refutation of Idealism, 11 Philosophical 
Studies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Oo., Inc., 1922), p. 27. 
3Ibid, p. 30. 
4-G. E. Moore, "A Reply to My Oritics", The Philosophy o:f 
G. E. Moore, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (Evanston: Northwestern 
University, 1942), p. 658. 
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the mind in favor of direct knowledge. 
The content of knowledge, that which lies in or before 
the mind when knowledge takes place, is numerically 
identical with the thing known. Knowledge by intermediaries 
is not denied, but is made subordinate to direct or pre-
sentative knowledge.1 
Blanshard's Reply 
Blanshard 1 s reply to this rejection of subjectivism 
.would surely begin with a clarification of his own convictions 
about the proper role of the subjective p~inciple in knowledge. 
G. E. Moore in his "The Refutation of Idealismn tries to prove 
that the statement "esse is percipin is always false. Forty 
years later he confesses that he failed to accomplish his 
mission.2 But even if he had been successful, this would not 
bring down judgment and destruction on Blanshard. A. 0. Ewing 
attempts to explain the idealist position by the following two 
sentences.. From the statement, 11 ! can onl.y know what is in 
relation to mind," is derived the further statemenj;, nr deny 
the existence of anything independent;o:f mind."3 Whiie 
Blanshard would be in whole hearted agreement with the first 
sentence, he does not go on to adopt the second. To understand 
Blanshard correctly, his distinction between potential and 
actual must be kept in mind constantly. In the realm of poten-
tiality, according to Blanshard, one can never deny the existence 
1Edwin B. Holt, et al, The New Realism, pp. 34, 35. 
(Introduction) 
2G. E. Moore, "A Reply to My Oriticsn, The Philosophy 
of G. E. Moore, p. 654. 
3A. o. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (London: 
Methuen & Oo., Ltd., 1934), p. 31. 
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of that which is independent of mind, for in so doing one would 
' 
' deny the actual of which prese:b..t awareness is the potential. I . 
The present is always unsatisfied and hungry. "Thought can-
! 
not swallow its object. 11 1_ In ~he discussion on nee-realism in. 
I 
I 
The Nature of Thought, Blanshard agrees with his opponent in 
! 
saying, "Truth and reality are;pernianencies; granted. My know-
ing is not a permanency; grant~d also.n2 Furthermore, if 
' 
Blanshard accepted Ewing's secbnd sentence above, there would 
I 
be no rhyme or reason for him ~o distinguish between the imman-
1 
. i • 
ent a:p.d transcendent ends •. Asj long as the separation is made, 
I Blanshard cannot be charged with perpetrating the subjectivist 
I 
i 
error, i.e • ., the mind is making! its own object. 
However, the case breaks down some in the realm of 
I 
actuality. Here the two ends ~re said to coincide.3 If this 
i 
means that the two ends ~re id~ntical, then in this stage, the 
I 
stage of the conc~ete universak, its ~ wouid be its percipi, 
I 
I 
though admittedly, percipi wou~d then have a different conno-
• i 
tation tha~ is usually given t~ it. In the previous chapter 
i 
it was pointed out that BlanshB.rd never speaks of an absolute 
I 
mind, only of a logical system!. Mind 'or thought as we know it, 
I is presently seeking ful.filme~t "in a reality that ~ fully 
I 
determinate. tt4 Blanshard herel sounds like a realist. Thought 
I 
1 I 2 Blanshard, NOT, I, 47~. ~~ I, 408. 
fulfil 
3Ibid, I, 488, Of. I, ~8:· "The two aims are equivalent 
other." j 
4~, I, 621, C.f. I, p63: 
itself in the reality. 11 J 
11 The aim of thought is to 
to each 
I 
• 
• 
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does not swallow its object, but perhaps the object swallows 
thought. Yet, on the other side of the ledger, as Bradley 
recognized, logical system is more like a mind than not. 
Blanshard 's system is a logical structure pat.terned after our 
present conscious experience. It may be that though thought 
never swallows its object in the realm of potentiality, it does 
swallow it in the realm of actuality. This, of course, would 
leave Blanshard vulnerable to the charge of ultimate subjectiv-
ism, i. e.~the mind makes its own object. 
Either of these two conclusions, or perhaps even both 
together may be dr~ if the two ends are identical. In any 
case it is certain that Blanshard could not tolerate independent 
fulfilment or actualization ot each end on its own terms. This 
would result in an ultimate dualism. If ideas or sense data 
are not, in some way, reality itself, they can never give to 
us the character of reality,1 declares Blanshard. He would 
assert that independent fulfilment of each end would re-introduce 
the stalemate produced by every theory of representationalism 
in knowledge. 
Aristotle states that potentiality is an eternal process 
which, due to the resistance of prime:. matter against the full 
infusion of form, can never reach actus purus.2 Every state of 
actuality achieved in nature contains within itself some 
1 illQ., I, 421. 
2see Aristotle's discussion in Metaphysics IX. XII. Of • 
Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy (2 vola.; rev. ed.; 
New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, Harper Torchbooks, 1901), 
pp. 144-145. 
• 
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potentiality. Only pure ~orm in which no potentiality is pre-
sent, escapes this dualism o~ potential to actual. Blanshard 
comes to a similar point of view when he says, 11 thought still 
.fails to reach and realize its object, as every idea fails ••• n1 
Insofar as he admits this, he escapes the charge of subjectiv-
ism and retains nearly as much realism as the realists. But 
if he asserts this failure as a metaphysical principle, as 
Aristotle does, and not just as an accident of man's existence, 
he denies his basic assertion that an idea really is the object 
partially realized.2 The dreaded, dualistic representationalism 
of Locke would appear once again. In any case, it can be said 
that Blanshard is a sophistioat.ed subjectivist who attempts to 
recognize the dependence of our consciousness upon a prior 
existing reality which is not of our own creation. 
Blanshard 1 s Oritique of Nee-Realism 
Switching from defense to offense, Blanshard charges 
that the distinction made between 'object perceived' and 'act 
of perceiving 1 is invali.d since the only ground for distinguish-
ing one act of perception from another is their particular oon-
tent.3 To talk about an act of perception without its content 
is to talk about a modern Ding an sioh. He asserts that if 
there is no basis for distinction among acts of perception ex-
cept their content, then there is no foundation for the dis-
1Ibid, I, 622. 2Ibid, I, 581. 
3~, I, 398; of. 403. 
• 
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tinction at all. 
Furthermore, in Blanshard's judgment, the theory of 
the nee-realists gives little or no help toward a solution of 
problems in epistemology. The claim to direct, 'presentative 
knowledge of reality 'brings into existence' far too many 
things.1 Besides. the existence of chairs, tables, eto., this 
view asserts that the particular pain of a headache, and a 
million other kindred things, are actual objects of our world. 
Blanshard feels that the champions of 'common sense' have out-
played themselves. Again, the claim to direct knowledge is 
refuted by the obvious presence of many intermediaries in the 
knowledge situation, Blanshard feels. To say that such inter-
me4iaries are subordinated is to beg the queStion. In the light 
of these internal difficulties, plus the failure to~e~plain 
knowledge and to dis.tinguish it from error, Blanshard believes 
that the new realism offers little real satisfaction. 
Oritioal Realism 
The critical realists attempt to straddle the fence 
between the new realism and the old idealism. Against the 
realist position that reality itself is presented in percep-
tion, the critical realists affirm that 
our data of perception are not actual portions, or 
select~d aspects, of the objects ~erceived. They are 
character-complexes (essences), irresistibly taken, 
• in the moment of perception, to be the characters of existing outer obJects.1 
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Critical realism is in agreement with nee-realism that "reals" 
exist in and for themselves, independently of any relation to 
mind. Their main historical contention has been in opposition 
to any theory that would reduce the world to a system of ideas, 
either in a finite mind or in an absolute mind. 
The Charge of Subjectivism 
Against idealism, the critical realists also attack 
subjectivism through the denial that the essences which appear 
in perception are mental states of the perceiver.2 
Santayana insists that essences which are given in 
intuition are appearances and nothing but appearances.3 The 
mental content, i.e. the datum, is an idea or description which 
is contemplated without belief concerning its existence and re-
lation to reality. When one asserts that such a thing exists, 
he is 
hypostatising this datum, placing it in presumptive 
relations which are not
4
internal to it, and worshipping 
it as an idol or thing. 
Essences never logically imply anything about reality 
1 Durant Drake t et al., Essays in Critical Realism: 
A Co-o erative Stud of the Problem of Knowled e (London: 
Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1920 , pp. 19-20. 
2!ill, P• 20. 
3George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), p. 24. 
4rbid, p. 35. 
• 
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since they are inert. Any steps from essences to reality 
result from a previously experienced "animal faithn, or "on 
some irrational persuasion or prompting of life.u1. The simple 
intuition of essences is not knowledge, for essence occupies 
'!another realm of being." 2 Knowledge, however, does use 
these essences as a set of symbols for existences that cannot 
enter experience. Knowledge, being a form of poetry, uses the 
direct intuition of essences as words symbolically to set forth 
reality.3 
Now surely this is some kind of subjectivism. Essences, 
though supposedly 'neutral entities•, do form the content of 
awareness. Furthermore 'animal faith' is a subjective process. 
But this form of subjectivism is quite different and contrary 
to the subjectivism of the idealists. It deni~s the fundamen-
tal thesis of idealistic subjectivism, that sense data and ideas 
form the only true key to unlock the secret of reality. Ideas 
are reality as potential, declares Blanshard. Santayana denies 
that either intuition of essence or animal faith lggically imply 
the real character of reality. Blanshard severely attacks 
Santayana's failure to link ideas or essences with reality. 
Santayana's statement that thinking "will never become. anything 
but a perpetual genesis of the unwarrantable out of the 
contingent",4 Blanshard feels, destroys causality, inference, 
1 Ibid. 
2~, p. 106. 3~, p. 102. 
4oited by Blanshard, NOT, I, 437· 
• 
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and with it the whole quest for truth. If subjectivism is 
totally isolated from the real, according to Blanshard, the 
result is a form of skepticism which is not improved by the 
introduction of dubious biological propensities. 
Argument from Common Sense 
A second major argument against idealism came in the 
form of a defense of ordinary language under the name of "common 
saase." In this case also, G. E. Moore is the spokesman with 
the publication in 1925 of 11A Defense of Common Sense". In it 
he defends the position, which he reasserts in 1942,1 that one 
can have certain knowledge about. one's present state, e.g. 'that 
I am now sitting in a chair'. This common sense certainty, it 
4lt is affirmed, refutes statements made by some philosophers, 
especially those in the idealistic tradition. In an essay on 
"Tlle Conception of Reality," 2 Moore takes Bradley to task for 
his statement that space and time, 'in the character which they 
exnibit', do not belong to reality. Moore feels that common 
sense assures us that we have lived in the past, that we can 
speak of past, present, and future. According to Moore, this 
evidence from common sense nrefutesn the philosophimil view 
that time is not real. The point is, Moore declares, that 
certain $states of affairs', facts of experience, are sufficient 
in themselves to refute philosophical theories. Two examples 
1G. E. Moore, nA Reply to My Criticsu The Philosophy 
of G. E. Moore, p. 677. · · 
2G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, pp. 197-219. 
• 
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of this would be the: .. ·refutation of the statement, 11 There are 
no material things," by simply raising one's hand and saying, 
nHere is one material thing,u or the refutation of the sen-
tence nTime is unreal" by reciting your days activities "After 
breakfast I went for a walk, and after that 'I went to the 
library.n 
One commentator of Moore believes the argument for 
common sense centers around the use of language rather than 
the truth of empirical propositions. "The essence of Moore's 
technique of refuting philosophical statements consists in 
pointing out that these statements g£ against ordinary 
language. 11 1 
The question for consideration here is whether or not 
this appeal to "common sensen refutes idealism or any of 
Blanshard 1 s convictions about the nature of thought. First, 
it should be noted that Blanshard recognizes and appeals to 
common sense for support of many issues, especially in the 
early stages of his argument.2 He prudently avoids philosophi-
c~l statements which deny common sense, believing that a good 
theory ought to explain what appears in common sense. But he 
also states that common sense is often very limited and itself 
needs to be evaluated in the light of total experience. 
It is easy enough to stand boldly for common sense against 
all metaphysical nonsense if one glues one's attention to 
selected familiar cases. While we stay in their com-
fortable circle, the view that we need only open our eyes 
1Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language", ~ 
Philosophy of G. E. Moore, p. 349; of. P• 352. 
2B1anshard, NOT, I, 411. 
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to see things as they are has some plausibility. But when 
we try to widen the circle so as to include the converging 
railway tracks and the bent spoon in the tumbler, mirror 
images ••• then our formula begins to crumble, for if there 
is a single fact or case that does not comport with it, 
it is false.1 
Moore's argument seems to be built on a conception of 
truth and propositions which is not acceptable to Blanshard. 
Moore thinks in terms of logical atomism in which the truth or 
falsity of a statement is to be fully determined within the 
limited context of a single perception judgment. Blanshard 
rejects this logic in favor of what he terms intensional logic, 
in which all the implications of a judgment or proposition must 
be considered in order to determine its truth. Through acceptance 
of the doctrine of internal relations with its degrees of truth, 
he has no difficulty in accepting the statement, "Here is my 
hand, a material thing"', on its own particular level, and also 
the statement, "There are no material things", on its level. 
The one should not judge the other absolutely, for both must 
be incorporated in a fully intelligent system, on Blanshard's 
view. 
Appeal to Realism 
The third major fault with idealism, according to its 
enemies, is that it holds that truth is a relationship of coher-
ence between judgments of thought rather than between thoughts 
and external things. The empiricists argue that such logical 
coherence is arbitrary and of secondary importance. First and 
1rbid, r, 147. 
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foremost, a statement is true by virtue of its stating.what 
is the case. 
Blanshard's reply is that stating 'what is the case• 
is no simple pro.cess of directly reading reality. Every theory 
of immediate presentation of reality fails to account for error, 
hallucinations, and the like. The concept of external reality, 
whether in Kant's Ding an sioh, Descartes 'material substanc~'., 
or the positivists 'external world' has never provided a valid 
justification of knowledge. Blanshard believes that verifi-
cation is not 11 externalu touching or seeing, or a direct con-
frontation with presented reality, but a process within a set 
of ·inferences and judgments.1 
Attack Upon Internal Relations and Necessity 
The fourth and final group of objections raised against 
idealism attack the belief in internal relations and necessity. 
It is customary today to make a sharp distinction between logic 
and facts.2 Many interpret necessity as a product of conven-
tion in language, a definition in a symbolic system. While 
logic has certainties, facts are always contingent; no aspect 
of the real world can be deduced from any other, so the theory 
goes. Blanshard denies this emphatically.3 He contends that 
necessity holds within systems. If a system is small and 
1Ibid, II, 227-259. 
2see A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: 
Dover Publications, 'Inc .. , 1936), Chapters One and Two. 
3Blanshard, NOT, II, 264. 
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considered abstractly, as in symbolic logic, necessity is 
easily seen. As the system is enlarged and the terms and in-
ferences are greatly multiplied, necessity may not be so 
easily seen, but it is always felt in the mind whose driving 
im.pmJhae is 11 the hunger for necessity. 11 1 "In what we take as 
the real world we can see the outlines of a necessary struc-
ture .that is the counterpart of thought • s idea1."2 
Some have insisted that the "full-buckettt view of the 
universe in which all things are necessarily related in system 
leads to contradictions. 
If it be insisted that whatever exists is logically nec-
essary, logical necessity must be made to embrace that 
from which it is distinguished by definition, such as 
contradiction, mere empirical existence, and error.3 
Blanshard does not specifically deal with this argument 
in The Nature of Thought though his general answer is quite 
clear. He does not conceive the world solely as a logically 
necessary system. He believes the goal of thought has a hun-
ger for necessity, and further, that in all probability the 
structure of reality is a necessary system of relations, but 
this is not to say categorically that everything is one 
necessary system. Present experience is not a logically 
necessary system. This realm of potentiality certainly has 
contradictions, error, and what appears to be mere empirical 
existence. However, as potentiality approximates its goal of 
2Ibid, NOT, II, 516. 
3Ralph Barton Perry, The Ap}roach to PhilosopAy {New 
York: Oharles Scribner's Sons, 1905 , pp. 421-422. 
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a fully necessary system, contradiction, error, and mere 
empirical existence diminish proportionately. "Oontradictiontt 
means two systems which are not related by necessity; nmere 
empirical existencen means objects not completely known; 
"error11 means the difference in what we mean to mean and what 
we do mean.1 If thought reached its goal of a complete system 
of judgments related by logical necessity - contradiction, 
mere empirical existence, and error would not be nembraced" 
in the total system, as Perry charges, since by definition 
they would not be anything to be embraced. These things have 
their only being in the potential realm where Blanshard insists 
that whatever exists is not logically necessary. The problem 
is really one of the relation of potentiality and actuality -
how can the real be in the form of ideal? 
Spaulding charges that the doctrine of internal rela-
tions is wrong since it cannot be universalized. 
In order to relate~ i two terms must be ::tpicked out • to be 
related. But if so, they can be known without their 
relations, therefore, relations are not internal to 
terms, i.e. constitutive of their essence.2 
This argument assumes a point which is the basis for 
the next objection concerning truth; namely, to know any term 
implies that one knows it really and completely. Or its 
converse, to hold that in order to know a thing one must know 
it completely, implies that one never really knows anything 
1see.Blanshard, NOT, I, 61-63. 
2Edwin B. Holt, ~ ~., The New Realism, p. 166. (Edward 
Gleason Spaulding) 
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about a thing unless one knows it absolutely. Blanshard's 
reply to Spaulding's argument is that we never 'pick out' a 
term out of nowhere. Even perception is not the receiving of 
an isolated term, but the selection of a term implicitly re-
lated to a higher order. In every act of knowledge, a univer-
sal is present.1 Of course a term can be considered inde-
pendent of certain relations, but this does not imply that it 
is·independent of them. Blanshard feels that the doctrine of 
internal relations does not apply to objects taken in that ab-
straction :which would plainly beg the questmon, but"in their 
real or natural habitat.u2 This provides the answer to several 
other objections. 
All then that the realist maintains is that, first a judgment about a limited aspect of reality commonly in-
tends to refer just to that aspect, and has not the least 
purpose of expanding to take in the universe; and secondly, 
that there is enough permanence in the structural elements, 
facts, or entities of which the known world is composed 
to justify the assertion that a statement about one or a 
. limited number of these may be really and completely true 
or false.3 
We do not have to have all truth in order to have some 
truth.4 
Blanshard holds that a judgment. may refer to a limited 
aspect if the maker of the judgment specifically chooses to 
make it do so. However, this is an abstraction, a process 
1Blanshard, NOT, I, 61-63. 2Ibid, NOT, II, 491. 
3Durant Drake, et aL, Essays in Oritical Realism, p.126. 
(Arthur K. Rogers) 
4Edwin B. Holt, et aL, The New Realism, P• 299. 
(William Pepperrell Montague) 
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which a person might perform for his own limited purposes, 
though it must not be taken as true of the judgment in its 
natural position in the world. Barring arbitrary abstraction, 
every judgmentdoes have the purpose of expanding so as to 
take in the universe, in Blanshard 1 s view.1 If a certain 
judgment is abstracted from its natural setting and placed in 
a limited, defined system, its truth or falsity may be com-
pletely known relative to that system, while its precise re-
lation to the total system can only be classified as probable. 
The degree of certainty rises with increased abstraction (e.g. 
the law of non-contradiction in logic is abstract and quite 
certain), and falls with increased concreteness (e.g. nThe 
universe is moral" is only probably true). 1 Really or com-
pletely true or false• applies only to the total system of 
judgments which have reality as their goal. nThat only is 
perfectly true which could be transplanted into such an in-
clusive and completely integrated system without subtraction 
or alteration.n2 
The statement of Montague about partial truth is no 
problem to Blanshard. Since the doctrine of internal.relations 
holds only when the immanent and transcendent ends have been 
reached, it does not follow that our present knowledge must be 
either completely true or false. If a mind reached its 
1Blanshard, NOT, I, 607. Of. I, 489. "An idea always 
points beyond itself ••• "_ 
2 Ibid, II, 304. 
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immanent goal then any knowledge would imply all knowledge. 
But this is not our lot, declares Blanshard. We must be con-
tent with degrees of truth in which a mixture of truth and 
error ooexist.1 Who can deny this! 
Conclusions 
In the light of these types of arguments pitted against 
Brand Blanshard, what conclusions can be drawn? First, as 
stated in the previous chapter, Blanshard feels that the argu-
ments and nre;futationn of the nee-realists and critieal realists 
entail no extensive changes in the views of Bradley and 
Bosanquet. All the problems enumerated here (along with many 
others discussed in Ohapters VII through XII of The Nature of 
Thought) can be resolved, Blanshard believes, within his own 
theory. The opponents of idealism, he believes, have offered 
no better theories, and more often than not what they have 
given has been most unsatisfactory under the pressure of 
analysis. They have all failed to answer the central problem 
of knowledge, i.e. uthought must be the same with its object ••• 
It must be different from its object.n2 The only satisfactory 
solution, according to Blanshard, is to conceive the idea as 
the same as the object, only realized partially. 
It appears that realism in both of its modern forms has 
led Blanshard to form his view with greater care respecting 
•objectivity 1 than was the case with the older forms of 
1~, II, 488-489. 2Ibid, I, 608. 
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idealism. The care£ul distinction between immanent and tran-
scendent ends is an e£fort to escape the charge of sub-
jectivism. The distinction permits Blanshard to have an ob-
jective reality which sets the pattern for the mind, a sort of 
mold into which mind is drawn. Mind does not make its own 
structure. But neither is it termed by an 'external' reality. 
The interaction of mind and reality is conceived in terms of 
teleology, not in terms of physical cause and effect, in 
Blanshard's theory.1 The secret formula for recognizing 
realism in the midst of idealism comes from Aristotle 1 s notion 
of the potential that becomes the actual.2 The known world is, 
therefore, not a product of the mind, but reality itself in its 
potential phase. The following chapter raises some doubt as 
to whether Aristotle's principle can be successfully used in 
this manner. 
1 Ibid, I, 477. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Blanshard's Solution to the Five Crucial Issues 
Raised in the Introduction. 
Dualism 
The first problem was the relation of our. ideas to the 
objects which they intend, i.e., the problem of epistemic 
dualism. The study has shown that Blanshard gives full re-
cognition to the apparent dualism·of subject and object in 
knowledge. The principle of potentiality-actuality implies 
that at any level below absolute knowledge, the content of the 
subject is not to be identified with the object. The obJect 
does not enter directly into our ideas in its fulness. The 
idea, as the potential of the object implies that there is 
always a distinction between the two. This distinction, how-
ever, is not of the type, Blanshard asserts, which denies a 
real similarity between.idea and object. One really does know 
the object through ideas which are defined as purposes to be 
the object. The similarity is not that of an image or like-
ness in terms of space, but a similarity by virtue of 
teleolpgy~ The idea is a purpose which the object alone 
would fulfil. 
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Hume occasioned many doubts by his reduction of ideas 
of causation to habit. The presupposition of dualism, that 
, 
the object is the ~aus~ of our ideas, seems to be essential 
to the claim of knowledge. Kant made causation a category of 
the mind, Whitehead reasserts it of reality itself, and 
Blanshard defines it as a form of logical implication holding 
between relations composing the actual world. If Blanshard's 
theory could be completely worked out, reality would be a set 
. 
of universals necessarily related in a deductive system. 
Present instances of what is termed causation are partial 
disclosures of this underlying logical necessity which related 
all things in one system. 
Dualism, according to Blanshard, cannot be the final 
analysis of knowledge. The critical realist demonstrates the 
conflicts which arise when dualism is accepted as ultimate. 
If the essences of sense data are not physical things, then 
these data cannot give the character of physical things.1 The 
underlying presupposition of knowledge, in Blanshard's opinion, 
must be a type of monism which denies that mind and the physical 
order are independent series, a view which provokes the problem 
of correspondence for dualists. While accepting a dualistic 
view of present knowledge (i.e. idea and its object are not 
identical), he asserts that this must be superseded in a final 
monism. 
1Brand Blanshard, NOT, I, 421. 
l .. 
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Subjectivism 
As an advocate of a view in essential agreement with 
that of the so called idealistic tradition, Blanshard may 
be susceptible to the charge of subjectivism. The study has 
shown, however, that Blanshard thinks of himself as a realist, 
if b7 this is meant that the subjective mind knows an abiding, 
objective world.1 The theory states that mind is under the 
influence of an .,independent pattern of an objective truth. 11 2 
Subjectivism is avoided by the assumption that the structure 
of the object is logically prior to the actualization of the 
idea and not vice versa. The actual logically precedes the 
potential. One of the weak points of Blanshard 1 s theory is 
his failure to discuss and define this issue of the priority 
of the actual over the potential. References to an Ulterior 
determinate order which mind seeks to know seem to indicate 
that Blanshard thinks of actuality as not only logically prior, 
but also ontologically prior to the potential realm of ideas. 
Many other references, however, show that the object is, by 
definition, that which the mind intends. Here the object 
emerges as the mind approaches its own immanent goal of a sy·s-
-~;;tem of necessary relations. The object is not set over 
against the mind and presented to it, as the realists contend, 
for it has its being in the judgments of the mind. Though 
Blanshard claims a realistic element in his system, he cannot 
1~, I, 488. 
2Blanshard, "Current Strictures on Reason," Philosophi-
cal Review, LIV (July, 1945), 347, of. NOT, I, 621. 
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be called a realis·t in the usual sense of the term. Since 
actuality, according to Blansbard, is a necessary system of 
essences, he is best classif&ed as an objective idealist. 
Skepticism 
The third problem is that of skepticism. The study has 
shown that Blanshard believes he has overcome the threat of 
skepticism in showing that an idea gives knowledge of reality 
by virtue of the fact that an idea is reality itself in a 
potential form. Every idea, therefore, presents in some 
degree an aspect of reality itself. All forms of representa-
tionalism, on Blanshard's view, do lead to skepticism, since 
denial of the presence of reality in the mind, at least in 
4lt some form, provides no rational criterion of objective truth. 
Coherence, therefore, is not only the criterion of truth, but 
also the nature of truth on this theory. Blanshard is carefUl 
not to claim absolute, certain knowledge, even though he con-
stantly stresses the fact that every true proposition contains 
a degree of necessity. While holding to an ideal of a 
logically necessary set of propositions embodying absolute 
truth, he affirms that all knowledge claims are subject to 
revision or correction in the light of further evidence. This 
failure to attain absolute, certain knowledge does not open 
the door to skepticism, since the seed of absolute knowledge 
is actually present in any proposition possessing a degree 
of truth. 
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Justification o~ Empirical Knowledge 
With his emphasis on judgment in perception, inter-
nality o~ all relations, the presence of necessity in all em-
pirical propositions, and an ultimate, logically necessary 
system, Blanshard might appear to many as an enemy o~ modern 
science. His works, however, allay these fears. He often 
appeals to the work o~ scientists for justi~ication o~ his 
views. The modern empirical methods o~ research can be incor-
porated into his system because the transcendent end is not 
known a priori in human e:x:p·erience. Science has an important 
~unction in the disclosure of the transcendent end of thought 
which is progressively unfolded. The scientist, engaged in a 
search ~or a system of relations in the mani~old sense content, 
presupposes some kind of significant connection between various 
events, often referred to as the 'uni~ormity of nature•. 
Blanshard believes that this connection is not adequately 
accounted ~or in terms of Humean habit or mere conjunction ot 
frequent occurrence. Only the principle of logical inference 
can provide an adequate relationship between events which is 
necessary to account for knowledge.1 While Blanshard accepts 
empirical research, he vigorously denouces the view of logical 
relations usually expressed in recent philosophy of science. 
I think that in the end all necessary propositions must 
be taken to assert o~ existence and tha~ no ~actual 
propositions are altogether contingent. 
1Blanshard, NOT, II, 507-508. 
2Blanshard, "Current Strictures on Reasonn, 
Philosophical Review, LIV (.July, 1 945) , 368. 0~. NOT, II, 406. 
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With the old principle of the uniformity of nature now 
strengthened by interpreting it as an instance of the principle 
of logical inference, Blanshard believes that empirical know-
ledge is real and justified. 
Epistemology and Metaphysics 
Blanshard 1 s epistemological study begins in the area 
of the cognitive processes of perception, imagination, and 
conception and ends in the area of metaphysics. It is his 
conviction that this process is inevitable since the problems 
which arise in the analysis of the cognitive processes of the 
mind can only be solved by the deeper conclusions of metaphysics. 
In making this transition, he attempts to remain with the facts 
disclosed in the nature of thought. He urges that he dis-
covers, and does not assume, the logical structure of reality. 
Much of the criticism given further on in this chapter centers 
on this area, expressing the conviction that Blanshard's 
metaphysical conclusions do, in fact, go beyond what his 
study of the nature of thought implies. 
Positive Oriticisms 
One of the great virtues of The Nature of Thought is 
its penetrating analysis of modern discussion in the area of 
epistemology. The polemic secttons of the work are excellent. 
No adequate and comprehensive discussion of epistemology can 
afford to overlook Blanshard 1 s nre:futation11 of nee-realism, 
-41t critical realism, pragmatism, and certain aspects of modern 
logic. In the opinion of the writer, Blanshard's arguments 
103 
against his oponents are conclusive. These other viewpoints 
must be reviewed in the light of Blanshard's criticism if 
they are to continue as worthy options.1 
The Nature of Thought is characterized, for the most 
part by careful, precise analysis of each point, set forth 
with great clarity, and with a minimum of technical or newly 
coined vocabulary. Very few stones are left unturned as the 
argument proceeds. Criticism is made difficult by virtue of 
Blanshard's anticipation of nearly all objections which might 
be made on each point. G. Watts Ounningham states, 
the author's constructive statement is everywhere fresh 
and direct and rich in concrete detail. It leaves little 
.to be desired either in clarity or comprehensiveness ••• 2 
One of the m~jor theses of The Nature of Thought, the 
development of a theory relating an idea. to an object, is 
quite successful. Of all the possible views, this provides 
more answers and fewer problems than any of the others, in the 
opinion of this writer. The principle of potentiality-
actuality is so flexible that it permits Blanshard to state 
two propositions which must be stated in the light of the 
evidence, yet appear to be contradictory; namely, an.idea 
is its object, and it is different from its object. The first 
1Agreement with this is not universal; Theodore F. 
Lafferty believes Blanshard is guilty of an unconscious in-
trusion of his own philosophy into the premises which he is 
attributi~ to pragmatism, thereby attacki~ a self made straw-
man. See 'Intercommunication in Philosophy' Journal of 
:Philosophy, XLIII (August 15, 1946), PP• 449-466. 
e 2G. Watts Cunningham, Review of The Nature of Thought, 
by Brand Blanshard, Philosophical Review, L (September,1941), 
p. 531. 
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satisfies the requirement that knowledge must reveal the ob-
ject, while the second complies with the obvious erroneous 
nature of :,,many idease Instead of assuming that whatever 
occurs in one's experience is somehow indicative of reality, 
or manifests reality, Blanshard attempts to show .that what 
occurs in experience is reality on the level of potentiality. 
Professor Bertocci in the final chapter of Brightman's 
Person and Reality states, 
the "given11 intractable sense qualities and the refractory 
order of sense data are inexplicable except as effects in 
the shining present of the absent. The sense data and 
their order thus become clues in the shining present to 
an illuminating absent.1 
But is-there any guarantee that the shining present is 
a true and faithful clue to the absent? Behind this view is 
the assumption that what occurs is not only caused by the 
absent, but also reveals the nature of the absent. On the 
personalistic view, even perfectly coherent experience gives 
no positive assurance that it has attained knovrledge of 
reality; an assumption o~ dualism through cause and effect 
• 
is still retained. Blanshard•s theory seeks to explain how 
present experience can be accepted as indicative or reality. 
He holds mo a real connection whe~eby perfectly coherent 
knowledge necessitates knowledge of the real. This, he feels, 
overcomes the·tendency to skepticism in all systems which do 
not introduce reality itself, in some form, into one's present 
experience. Blanshard is to be commended for this attempt to 
1E. s. Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 349. 
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show the real relation between reality and our experience. 
Due to the pliancy of the potentiality-actuality 
principle, Blanshard's theory seems to be able to adapt 
itself to contrary. points of view. The advantage of this is 
evident in a reading of nrefutations" of idealism. Blanshard 
is very seldom included in the wholesale denunciations of . 
monists as those who cannot explain error or illusion, while 
most of the favorable arguments for dualism can be easily 
adopted into his system. The principle of potentiality-
actuality allows him to accept the good points of both 
monism and dualism and to escape their weaknesses. The great 
disadvantage in the principle, discussed further on in this . 
chapter, is its failure to explain the ultimate relationship 
of the two terms in a non-temporal system. 
Negative Criticisms 
".J?otentiality-Actualityn as a Principle of Explanation 
The first negative criticism of Blanshard's theory of 
ideas concerns the use of 'Potentiality-Actuality' as a 
principle of explanation. Blanshard feels that his category 
of explanation is the only one which correctly interprets the 
nature of thought.1 Even though the empiricists reject it, 
we are told that it is essential for a correct understanding 
of what psychologists call dispositions and is particUlarily 
pertinent to the understanding of the relation of an idea to 
1Blanshard, NOT, I, 190-191. 
~ its object. 
Although Blanshard's reasons for appealing to this 
principle are clear, his success in using it is not clear. 
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This is partly due to the ~act that the concept of potentiality 
is vague. Any change, development, or process presupposes a 
corresponding potency, i.e., the capacity a thing has of 
passing into a different state. But 'capacities' are very 
nebulous entities, o~~ering little assistance toward real 
understanding. Science disposes of metaphysical potentiality 
because it cannot be observed. 
The concept of potentiality is convenient in some 
connections, provided it is so used that we can translate 
our statement into a form in which the concept is absent •••• 
But when potentiality is used as a fundamental and 
irreducible conceptf it always conceals confusion of 
thought. Aristotle s use o~ it is one of the bad points 
of his system. 1 
In Blanshard's system, potentiality is used as a 
~undamental and irreducible concept which reveals a signi-
~icant characteristic of mind. What of the charge that it 
conceals confusion of thought? Blanshard almost admits this. 
He confesses that he does not fully understand what potentiality 
implies, but he is equally certain that the concept is necessary 
in order to understand that aspect of thought which he calls 
dispositions. 
Without pretending that dispositions as now known are 
entities with which we can rest satis~ied, we should hold 
that the theories that dispense with them are even less 
able to cover the ground.2 
1Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 167. 
2Blanshard, NOT, I, 190. 
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On several occasions Blanshard uses the principle o£ 
potentiality~actuality to explain that an idea is a potential 
£orm o£ an object. "The idea is its object partially 
reali~ed."1 Blanshard believes that the adoption o£ a theory 
which holds that ideas are never the object, but only copy 
it, or in some way report it, reduce knowledge to chance or 
miracle,2 while realism is to be rejected because it holds 
that an idea is the object.3 
Now so £ar as I can discover, there is one way only o£ 
relating idea to object which o££ers any hope o£ meeting 
satis£actorily these various requirements at once. This 
is the relation o£.the potential to the actual, or (what 
is apparently a species o£ the same) o£ unrealized to 
realized purpose •• ~ .. When we say that an idea is~ 
an object, we are saying that the idea is a purpose 
which the object alone would £ul£il, that it is a 
potentiality which this object alone would actualize, 
4 a content in£ormed by an impulse to become this object. 
The potentiality-actuality principle is supposed to 
provide £or the ultimate identity o£ subject and object as 
required according to Blanshard's de£~nition o£ knoWledge. 
However, this end seems to be accomplished at the expense o£ 
an adequate conception o£ both subject and object. The £ailure 
to de£ine adequately the nature o£ the object, and the £ailure 
to work out a concept o£ personality,5 reveal the £act that 
subject and object canno~ be related as the potential to the 
actual without violating the nature o£ both. 
1Ibid, I, 581. 0£. Blanshard, nThe Nature o£ Mind," 
Journal o£ ~hilosop~y, XXXVIII-(April, -1941), 211. 
2Ibid, NOT, I, 492. 3Ibid, NOT, I, 551. 
4Ibid, I, 473. 
5see discussion o£ these topics below. 
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Furthermore, while the concept of potentiality in his 
system depends upon the concepts of purpose and teleology, 
he does not explain how $hese operate in a non-temporal 
system. A non-temporal and necessary system of internally 
related essences seems to leave no room whatsoever for that 
which is merely potential. 
Concerning the Object of an Idea 
Blanshard's explanation lacks clarity concerning the 
"objectn of an idea. If an idea is defined as a specie of an 
object and the definition of the object itself is less than 
clear, it follows that the definition of an idea 1vill not be 
clear. Bl.anshard often uses the term"object 11 in his section 
on perception, which deals primarily with what he calls 
psychology. Here the object appears to be the object of 
common sense, the physical object of the unsophisticated, 
average man. In later chapters where the metaphysical interest 
becomes quite dominant, he still speaks o! an idea as a po-
tential form of its object. The term "object" has so many 
meanings in philosophy that it is 1ncumbent upon a writer to 
make his use of the term very explicit. Ledger Wood qualifies 
the term object by the adjectives 11 cognitiven, nepistemic", 
"ontologicaltt, ,.perceptual.", "physical", nperceivedn, 
"phenomenal. •11 Blanshard, in failing to make these dis-
tinctions, introduces ambiguity into his definition of an idea. 
1Ledger Wood, The Analysis of Knowledge (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1940). 
f'orm? 
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What is the object of' which an idea is the potential 
If' one stresses the immanent goal of thought to satisf'y 
itself' in a complete, necessary system of' judgments, then the 
object would be an absolute idea. · Each particular idea would 
seek its place in a deductive ·system, f'orming an unbroken chain 
f'rom any one idea out to another idea and to the entire system 
of' ideas. 
This appears to have been the view of' Bradley and 
Bosanquet. A:fter stating their view, Blanshard never re:futes 
it and appears to accept its validity. 
Finally ••• ther~ is the theory that every perception is a judgment in which the entire content, both what is given 
and what is not, is asserted of' reality. In this theory 
the 6b;)ect has its being in the judgment, and the· onJ.y 
way in which an object more real than this can be attained 
is to develop the present judgment into a complete and 
coherent system.1 
This def'inition implies that idea and its object are 
basically the same order of' being. AQcordingly, one woUld 
think that the burden of' argument should be to show how and 
why idea and object di:ff'er, rather than to argue how they are 
intrinsically related. If' the object has its being in judgment, 
it seems an idle task to prove that idea and object are one, 
since this has already been determined by the de:finition. 
Such procedure is open to a criticism made by Tillich. 
Idealism in all its :forms has discovered that there is no 
way from the 'absolute ego' to the non-ego, from the 
absolute self' to the world, :from the pure subject to the 
objective structure of reality. In each case that which 
is supposed to be derived is surreptitiously slipped into 
1Ibid, NOT, I, 144. Underlining added. 
.that :from which it is to be derived. !Chis. trick o:f 
deductive idealism is the precise counterpart o:f the 
trick o:f reductive naturalism.1 
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This argument o:f Tiilich's would be decisive against 
Blanshard i:f he gave no :further definition to the object of an 
idea. But Blanshard seems to go on to speak o:f an objective 
reality which at times controls the course o:f our thought. 
Mind is under the "independent :pattern o:f an objective truth.n2 
He :further states that knowledge claims uthe disclosure of 
an ulterior order to which it is in some sense adjusting it-
self. If this is realism, then all of us are realists.u3 
Blanshard :prefers to call the immanent goal of thought the 
standard of knowledge, while the transcendent goal of thought 
is the revelation of the object of-knowledge. If thought knew 
nothing beyond itself, it would have no object.4 Here the 
object appears to be more objective, more ontological than in 
the previous definition. An idea is a potential form of 
objective reality. At this :point it becomes essential to 
:present argument for the intrinsic unity o:f idea and object 
since the two apparently, are not of the same order of being 
and can not be related simply by definition. What does it 
mean to say that an idea is a :potential form of reality, and 
what evidence can be given that this is the case? 
1paul ~illich, Systematic Theology (Ohicago: The 
University of Ohicago Press~ 1957), II, 174. 
2Blanshard, "Ourrent Strictures on Reason,n 
Philosophical Review, LIV (July, 1945), 347. -
3Blanshard, NOT, I, 488. 4rbid, I, 490. 
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Since proof of the intrinsic relation of idea and 
object by means of definition is open only to the argument 
that the object has. its being in the judgment, it remains for 
some other kind of evidence to support the contention that an 
idea is related to an independent object as the potential to 
the actual. In support of this claim, Blanshard again and 
again appeals to the argument that if it is not ~o, then 
there is no way to account for knowledge. In speaking of 
the immanent and transcendent·ends of thought he states, nnow 
it was the chief contention of our second book that these 
ends are one. Indeed unless they are accepted as one, we 
could see no alternative to ~kepticism."1 nif thought and 
things are conceived as related only externally, then knowl-
edge is luck.n2 He further states that the only explanation 
of truth is the fact that an idea is in some way the object.3 
If our logic, i.e., our inner standard of thought, does not 
hold of the real world tb?-n there is no knowledge.4 
Objective reality and ideas are intrinsically related, 
for only this assumption can explain kriowledge,.Blanshard holds. 
Furthermore, knowledge is defined as relations within a sys-
tem. Whatever is perceived or known, according to this view, 
must be related in system. ~he completed set of such relations 
is the immanent end. It follows that if the transcendent goal 
was different than the imm~nent goal, one could never know it 
1rug_, II, 262. 
3rug_, II, 428. 
2~, II, 261. 
4Ibid, r, 492. 
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since to know means to be related according to the standard 
of the immanent goal. Accordingly, the transcendent goal is 
reduced to the immanent goal. The criterion of system, asserts 
Blanshard, is .the only possible method for determining the 
presence of the real in our knowledge.1 Since the tran-
scendent end and the immanent end are identical, when one 
reaches the immanent end, one also achieves the transcendent 
end. It appears that, in spite of the distinction of two 
ends in thought, and the apparent separation of a set of 
judgments over against objective reality, Blanshard does 
assert that the being of the object is in the judgment, and 
Tillich's criticism previously given does stand in judgment 
on his system. If this is so, the epistemic definition of 
idea as a potential object is implied in the metaphysical 
definition that all ontological objects are of the nature of 
mind and its ideas. By reducing the transcendent object to 
the immanent object, Blanshard has asserted that reality is 
nothing but a logical structure. In such a case ideas could 
not be anything'but intrinsically related to their objects. 
There are times when Blanshard seems to steer away 
from the certainty of logical structure and raises doubts that 
the real world does in fact form such a system. It is said 
that there is no way one can now prove that thought will 
always find logical necessity, but neither can one prove that 
13:bid, II, 448. 
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this is not the case.1 nit may be that between qualities there 
is no relation that in the end is intelligible. 11 2 Such 
assertions introduce a new form of Kant's Ding an sich. In 
an attempt to be as empirical as possible, Blanshard speaks 
of these possibilities. Yet they are not real for him since 
the system as set forth denies all possible knowledge that the 
world was in fact structured in a non-logical way. If the 
,world was in fact non-logical, it would not imply that ideas 
were not potential forms~I•Of objects, but only that it would 
be impossible to have ideas of such a reality. A reality of 
this type is, in fact, denied existence in Blanshard 1 s system. 
A non•logical world would be an or~han,child. 
The statement that an idea is the object in potential 
form suffers on two sides. First, the concept of potentiality 
as a principle of explanation is vague. Second,· it is doubt-
ful as to just what the object is of which the idea is the 
potential. The principle of potentiality-actuality is first 
applied to ideas and objects in an attempt to explain how the 
two can be related. It was seen, however, that the object 
has its being in the set of judgments made by the mind. The 
object, having its being in the mind, is, therefore, by 
definition ao related to idea that the definition of an idea 
as a form of its object is implied in the definition of the 
object. The definition of an idea as a potential form of 
1Blanshard, "Ourrent Strictures on Reason, 11 
Philosophical Review, LIV (July, 1945), 361. 
2Blanshard, NOT, I, 653. 
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- reality is a consequent o:f the de:fini tion o:f reality. It 
defines reality as well as idea. The principle o:f potentiality-
actuality bridges the gap between idea and object, the central 
problem in epistemology, only because the gap is ultimately 
denied in the particular definition e:f the object of knowledge. 
'-
This monistic tendeney is also seen in the identifi-
cation o:f the two goals o:f thought in their completed stage. 
The satisfaction of the 1 hunger of. the mind' in perfect, com-
pleted system cons.titutes a revelation of reality itself', we 
are told. "Thought discloses reality in the degree to which 
it achieves its own ideal.u1 The immanent and transcendent 
ends are said to coincide;2 to be equivalent to each other;3 
to be one with each other;4 therel:>y delivering thought :from 
the skepticism of' solipsism. This relationship appears early 
in the discussion where Blanshard denies any non-inf'erential 
knowledge in perception in :favor o:f mediated knowledge 
through a judgment· o:f the mind. There is no such thing as 
'knowledge by acquaintance'. It is :further asserted in his 
definition of a particular as being constituted by universals 
and nothing else.5 When one delineates every possible uni-
versal associated with a particUlar object, according to 
Blanshard, there is no surd; no opaque element remaining. 
Reality is of the nature of mind, or at least of' the nature 
1Blanshard, NOT, I, 488. 
2Ibid, I, 488, cf. II, 263, 428, 451. 
3rbid, I, 78. 4Ibid, II, 262. 
5rbid, I, 631, cf. 635. 
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immanent and transcendent ends is seen in his defense of what 
he terms intensional logic wherein every formal statement 
refers to the real world.1 There is no final separation of 
form and content, the content is composed of fulness of £orm 
and form is not less than content.2 
Blanshard qualifies this by saying that i£ the tran-
scendent end was identified with the immanent end as now 
achieved, t~e result would be sol+p~ism, while to reduce the 
immanent end, Etlia realized, to the transcendent end would 
raise all the difficulties about error that have been the bone 
of neo-realism.3 It would seem, however, that in a non-
temporal, logically necessary system these problems remain 
with the system regardless of the level of advance. If one's 
present finite· system of ideas imp~icitly implies the real 
world and implication is non-temporal, it follows that reality 
implies one's present system of ideas including all its errors. 
The identification of the transcendent and immanent ends of 
thought does not imply solipsism so much as an outright denial 
of personality as in panobjectivism. 
Blanshard seems to hold that since knowledge demands a 
1 l.lli, II, 421. 
2Bowne's phrase "life is deeper than logic" is inter-
preted by Brightman to mean that content is more than form. 
See Brightman, Person and Reality (New York: The Ronald Press 
Oompany, 1958), p. 21. This discloses a true ep1stem1o dualism 
and a metaphysical pluralism on the part of personalists which 
is not found in Blanshard • 
3Blanshard, NOT, I, 493. 
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necessary relation between terms, idea and its object must, 
in some way, be :one. An idea, defined as a purpose to be its 
object, must in some way actually become its object. In order 
to make this possible, Blanshard tegards the two ends as one. 
He asserts .that only monism can account for this purpose 
within an idea to be its object. E. s. Brightman, while 
holding that ideas are purposes directed tow$rd an object, 
presents one state in which, he feels, an idea reveals its 
object but could not possibly become its object. 
We can then r·eally have a true idea about what can never 
be identical with the idea; I can truly know that yesterday 
I went to the dentist, although my knowledge is today and 
the visit yesterday is in the irrevocable past ••• it is 
obviously impossible for my idea ever to ·coincide 
monistically with a past event.1 
Olearly this argument rests on a belief in the ultimate 
reality of time and duration as experienced by persons, a con-
viction which Blanshard does not accept. He specifically re-
jects temporal order in favor of a doctrine of identity.2 But 
the :fact remains that here and in other sections, Brightman is 
convinced that the revelation of an object through ideas does 
not necessitate monism in any form. While Brightman pleads 
for restraint in formulating metaphysical conclusions on the 
basis of the epistemic situation, Blanshard deduces the nature 
of the world as a whole from what he conceived to be the 
nature of knowledge.3 
1E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (Rev. 
ed.; New York: Henry Holt and Oompany, 1951), p. 85. 
2Blanshard, NOT, I, 649. 3Ibid, II, 266, 267. 
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The identity o:f the two ends o:f thought, along with the 
theory that an idea is a potential :form o:f reality is presented 
as an answer to the skepticism inherent in dualism, yet in this 
theory we never do in :fact get beyond :dualism and a probable 
:form o:f knowledge. Instead o:f being introduced to experience 
o:f certain, monistic knowledge, one is con:fronted with large 
amounts o:f metaphysical theory which allegedly substantiate 
the epistemological theory. As Brightman put it, this type o:f 
view ngives an account o:f divine epistemology but leaves us 
human beings still on a dualistic basis.n1 
The escape :from subjectivism and solipsism is accom-
plished by Blanshard with the assumption that the present 
tt system o:f knowledge is less than reality itsel:f; it is a 
potential :form o:f reality. Evidence :for this, however, is 
not a comparis.on o:f present knowledge with reality, since 
reality qua reality is never given, but a certain unsatis:fied 
state in one's being. Ideas seem to have a transcendent re£-
·erence; they are characterized by intentionality.2 This 
characteristic o:f an idea :forms the basis o:f Blanshard's 
distinction between the present state o:f knowledge and reality. 
When ideas no longer have this characteristic, reality will be 
present qua reality. 
It is doubt:ful, however, that the transcendent re:ference 
1E. s. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 92. 
2Blanshard, NOT, II, 489. nAn idea always points 
beyond itsel:f.n 
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of ideas is sufficient evidence for the distinction between 
one's self and reality.1 This is especially true in Blanshard's 
system where ideas do not manifest reality so much as consti-
tute it. Here reality is defined only by what now exists; 
it is never given independently of ideas. Indeed, reality 
cannot be anything different from those characters and relations 
given in ideas. The distinction, therefore, between a person's 
idea of reality and reality itself; in this theory, is actually 
a distinction between two aspects of a person's own experience, 
rather than between present experience and reality. In order: 
to overcome the solipsism inherent in all of this, Blanshard 
postulates a transcendent end of thought. This seems to 
answer the problem of solipsism, though it undermines his 
previous position on the nature of ideas and their relation 
to the real, if it is kept distinct from the immanent end. 
Since Blanshard denies the separation of two ends, it appears 
that he is driven back again into solipsism. The theory states 
that any present idea of reality implicitly entails reality.2 
When the content of the idea becomes fully explicit it becomes 
1E. S. Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 347. Peter 
A. Bertocoi in his last chapter of this volume argues that 
"the experience of objective reference is in itself a con-
tributing, but not a complete, ground for inferring the 
existence of a past self, a future, or a nonself, or for deter-
mining the existence of any particular kind of non self, as 
many realists, materialists, rationalists, and absolute 
idealists hold. 11 
2Blanshard, NOT, II, 265n. 
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reality. Immanent and transcendent ends are indist~nguishable 
in the ~inal stage. 
The appeal to a transcendent end o~ thought ~oes not 
seem to provide the objectivity which Blanshard desires. He 
states that we must have a transcendent end or we will not 
have an object.1 Yet the object o~ knowledge, in Blanshard's 
view, is ~ound only in the judgments o~ the mind. This is a 
reSll;lt·· o~ a two-~old denial, namely, that reality qua reality 
is given in knowledge and that the immanent and transcendent 
ends o~ knowledge are two independent variables.2 The as-
sumption of a transcendent end appears in Blanshard's system 
as a new version o~ Kant's thing-in-itsel~. It serves the 
purpose o~ delivering the system ~rom solipsism as well as 
providing some ~orm of "causationn ~or our ideas, but analysis 
neither reveals it, directly, nor displays its essential 
position in the system. If two things are really one, there 
is no need to call them two. If the assumption of a tran-
scendent end of thought was dropped from the system, no signi-
~icant change woUld result. The doctrine o~ the transcendent 
end is unnecessary. The attempt is made to overcome the ~ego­
centric-predicament• by asserting that our thought reaches 
out to a fixed reality, but in the end the predicament is 
overcome by a denial o~ its existence. The object o~ knowi-
·.edge is reduced to the content of knowledge. 
Further, this theory in asserting that reality appears 
1Ibid, I, 490. 2Ibid, I, 491. 
-· 
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in a potential form and that immanent and transcendent ends 
are really one, can never be proven below t4e stage of 
actuality. Admittedly, the relation between an idea and reality 
is difficult either to explain or prove, yet it should be for-
mulated in a manner which admits some kind of pro@2ssing 
evidence. In Blanshard 1 s view the only evidence that reality 
is being approached is the satisfaction which comes to a mind 
in the formation of coherent systems. This is considered as 
evidence that reality is being approached, but only.because 
it is first assumed that the immanent end and the transcendent 
ends are one. Again Tillioh's criticism applies, nin each 
case that which is supposed to be derived is surreptitiously 
sJ.ipped into 'that from which it is to be derived.n1 
Time 
Blanshard makes it very clear that the use of such 
terms as purpose, actualization, process, and development do 
not imply that thought is a temporal process. The relation 
of an idea to an object is to be conceived in its __ essential, 
logical aspect, not as a temporal lapse. 2 Since the "ultimate 
object of thought ••• is an aJ.l-inclusive·system in which 
everything is related internally to everything else,n3 
BJ.anshard asserts that "spatial and temporal. reJ.ations are 
1see above on page 109. 
2Blanshard, NOT, I, 515-517. 
3Ibid, II, 453· 
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. . 
thus themselves universals.n1 The previous hypothesis that 
the immanent and. transcendent ends of .thought are one implies 
that the temporal process cannot be taken as Ultimately real. 
The asserti.on of monism carries with it the denial of real 
time and duration.2 Blanshard asserts that "if you take 
identity seriously, ·you cannot also take the space and time 
order to be real, just as it comes to. us." 3 
In answer to the charge that teleology, fulfilment 
of purpose, relation of potential to actual are temporal re-
lations, Blanshard appeals to mathematics as an instance of 
a non-temporal process. He.admits that all of our words 
used to express this relation are impregnated with suggestions 
of time, but believes that this temporal quality can be ex-
cluded without detriment to the real meaning. He does not 
attempt to explain the cause and true nature of this seem-
ingly significant quality which is actually not real, 
according to his view. 
However, the principle of potentiality-actuality does 
seem to imply the reality of temporal process. The mathema-
tician may be able to abstract the temporal character of his 
analysis, but he can never escape the experience of duration 
while he is engaged as a mathematician. Blanshard of course 
admits this with the qualification that one's experience of 
1Ibid, I, 636. 
2see E. s. Brightman, Introduction to Philosoph.y, 
p. 92; of. 93, 86. 
3Blanshard, NOT, I, 650. 
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duration is a universal in relation with ather universals in 
a nan-temporal, logical system. This still fails, however, 
to explain the mathematician•s experience of duration while 
working with ideas which themselves appear to have a temporal 
quality. If time is a nan-temporal universal, whence arises 
the sensation, the illusion of duration,? .. 
Haw can the nan-temporal, the nan-enduring, produce 
the temporal without itself betng or becoming temporal 
at the very moment time began? . 
Reality should explain what happens in our experience, nat 
deny it. This ·divisi.an a:f reality and what appears leads to 
·same confusion an the relation of ideas to thought. Blanshard 
sometimes seems to identify the twa as in Book I where the 
nature of thought is discovered in the id·eas w1 thin men's 
minds. Other times he speaks of ".thought as such, n2 an 
. "': .. 
immanent end divorced ~rom ideas. This concept of thought 
robs ideas of their yery obvious temporal reference. 
Bla.nshard states that his .study of the nature of 
thought is thoroughly empirical.3 Y~t it appears that his 
denial of real time is a denial of an obvious empirical :fact. 
Twa of our most ubiquitous experiences are memory of past 
events and anticipation of :future events. Any view of reality 
1E. S. Brightman, Person. and Reality, p. 132. 
2Blanshard, NOT, II, 291; of. 453. 
3Ib1d, I, 13. (Preface) 
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must account for this experience. Brightman states, 
an empirical idealist or personalist holds that any 
view of time must be co~erent with time as it is found 
in the shining present. 
Through an overemphasis on rational experience and a con-
viction that truth is consistent only with monism, Blanshard 
denies one of the fundamental experiences of man. 
Non-logical Factors 
Blanshard's intense commitment to the eventual 
success of man 1 s reason stands as a healthy corrective to 
the pessimism of the existentialist thinkers. Though he 
admits that it cannot now be proven that our world is per-
fectly amenable to thought's inner demand, he believes that 
one should never forsake the pursuit of reason for some kind 
of irrational existence. But Blanshard's optimism carries 
him too far. In the light of his denial of non-logical 
factors in the theory, can existence itself be explained ad-
equately? He states that nexistence is not different in 
kind from universals, but is a product of. universals them-
selves."2 Paul Weiss maintains that existence is a levBl of 
being quite distinct from essence and can never be reduced to 
essenoe.3 Blanshard 1 s conviction that existence can be re-
duced to essence is, of course, not demonstrable this side 
1E. s. Brightman, Person and Reality, pp. 119,120. 
2Blanshard, NOT, I, 502. 
3see Paul Weiss, Modes of Being (Oarbondale, Illinois: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1958), p. 194. 
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of the absolute, whereas the non-essentialist's view seems 
to be supported by present experience. If Blanshard's 
definition of ideas as potential forms of objects is correct, 
it implies that reality is nothing but essence. Others see 
our world from a totally different perspective. 
Whatever its ultimate meaning, the universe into which· 
we have been thrown cannot satisfy our reason, 1let us have the courage to admit it once and for all. 
In a non-temporal system with no non-logical factors, 
error becomes a serious problem. Blanshard thinks of error 
as a discrepancy between what we do mean and what we mean to 
mean. 2 Error is a mistake of a particular purpose directed 
. toward its object. But where is the locus of error· in the 
completed system? If the relations which an erroneous idea 
has to other things is really part of the total system, then 
either there is no error or the total system contains contra-
dictions. Since time is not real for Blanshard, he cannot 
say that. the error is outgrown and dissolved. An incorrect 
idea, in Blanshard's theory, remains as much a part of reality 
as a true idea; it is a particular formed by its relations to 
other particulars in a non-temporal, eternal reality. As an 
incorrect idea, it contradicts its object. There are, there-
fore, in reality two incompatible things. The claim is made, 
however, that reality is a harmonious system. This view 
suffers from the obvious conflict of certain aspects of reality 
1Gabriel Marcel, PhilosophY of Existence (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 92. 
2see :Slanshard, NOT, I, 512. 
• 
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which ar.e devoid of an element of content and refuse to be 
gathered up and transmuted in the depth of reality. 
Personality 
Thought, mind, and reason are often mentioned by 
Blanshard while little is said about persons. One of the great 
weaknesses of The Nature of Thought is its failure to develop 
a view of personality, either cosmic or individual. Oosmic 
personality is rejected in favor of what might be best termed 
panobjective essentialism. Since mind is present when pursuit 
of~ends is present,1 the absolute cannot be called mind. 
Blanshard's conception of ideas as developing by 
themselves reveals his failure to work out an adequate view 
e of human personality. A. O. Ewing pointed up the problem when 
he said, 
unless :_we are going to half personify ideas and treat 
them as capable ot indulging in nideal self-development" 
of their own ·accord I do.not see how we can avoid ad-
mitting·mental acts over and above ideas.2 
Blanshard'~ complete essentialism and the doctrine of 
internal relatio~s implies that all finite minds are ultimately 
one with the total system. According to the theory, what is 
now experienced as t~e privacy of the self is simply a 
limitation placed upon men by t.heir own ignorance and not by 
reality. Theoretically,. the content of another's mind is as 
1Blanshard, "The Nature of Mind," Journal of Philosophy, 
XXXVIII (April 10, 1941), 207. 
2A. o. Ewing, Review of The Nature of Thought, by 
Brand Blanshard, Mind, LIII (January, 1944), p. 77. 
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open to knowledge by an outsider as any material object. 
However, this is contrary to present experience which points 
to a .fixed gulf between minds.1 The .failure to develop an 
adequate view o.f personality results, not only in a denial 
o.f present experience, but also in a con.fusion between the 
relation o.f thought (a logical structure) and ideas (purposes 
entertained by men). 
Fallacy o.f Initial Predication 
Perhaps the most serious charge against Blanshard is 
one .familiar to monists, namely, that he commits the .fallacy 
o.f initial predication. From the claim that knowledge consists 
in the necessary relation of essences in a single system, he 
deduces the nature of reality. For example, the discussion 
on the definition o.f a 'particular' closes with the statement, 
nthe only true particular is the abso1ute.n2 The knowledge 
claim not only determines the nature of a particular, but 
also predetermines the nature of reality as monistic rather 
than pluralistic. Cunningham states that Blanshard's 
continued insistence on the possibility of determining 
important ontological features of "the immanent end 
of thoughtu merely by appealing to.thought's "satis-
factionn before the eventuality of its uactualizationn 
remains to my mind a flat self-contradiction.3 
1A. a. Ewing, Idealism, A Critical Survey (London: 
Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1934), pp. 406, 407. 
2 Blanshard, NOT, I, 639. 
3G.·Watts Cunningham, Review o.f The Nature of Thought, 
by Brand Blanshard, Philosophical Review, L (September, 1941), 
533. . 
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AB.STRACT 
BRAND BLAN.SHARD' .S THEORY OF IDEAS 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain, interpret, 
and evaluate critically Brand Blanshard's theory of ideas as 
given in his magnum opus, The Nature of Thougb.t. 1 
The method of analysis employed is primarily compar-
ative. Chapter One is a direct exposition of Blanshard's 
theory. Chapter Two investigates Blanshard 1 s relationship 
to his immediate predecessors~ the English and American 
absolute idealists 1 in order to determine whether or not his 
revision of their thesis is major or minor~ and at what points. 
Chapter Three is an analysis of Brand Blanshard's reply to 
nee-realism and critical realism which allegedly ttrefuted" 
absolute idealism. Chapter Four is concerned with a critical 
evaluation of Blanshard's theory of ideas. 
The study discloses that Brand Blanshard's definition 
of the nature of thought is best expressed by the word 
. purpose. An idea is a purpose to become its object. Mind is 
a process which discloses its own nature and the nature of 
reality as it approaches fulfilment of its inner goal. The 
immanent goal of the mind is satisfied only when all of its 
1Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thougnt (2 vols.; 
London: George Allen·& Unwin Ltd., 1939). 
e·· 
objects have been related in necessary system. Achievement 
of this end is also a revelation of reality, the transcendent 
end of thought. In present experience the two ends of 
thought are distinct though not discrete. Ideas in the mind 
are potential forms of the actual world. Therefore, ideas 
can be accepted as truly revealing reality since they are 
reality (potentially), yet ideas may be incorrect since they 
are not reality (actually). 
The comparison with previous absolute idealists dis-
closes that Blanshard does not represent a new school of 
thought, only a revision, clarification, and modern defense 
of the position of the older idealism. His analysis and 
searching criticism of nee-realism and critical realism 
leaves them disfigured. Their inability to solve the dilemma 
of knowledge of reality as it is over against the mind's 
distortion in error strengthens Blanshard's assertion that 
the problem is solved by conceiving ideas as potential forms 
of reality. An idea both is and is not reality. 
In spite of the apparent success, the theory has 
several weaknesses. The principle of the potential which 
becomes actual is too vague in itself to be used as a 
principle of explanation for an entire system. Furthermore, 
Blanshard defines idea as a specie of an object, but the 
definition fails insofar as he ambiguously defines the object. 
The object, according to this theory., has its being in the 
judgments of the mind and is not given immediately. vfrlen 
the judgments of the mind reach the stage of perfect inclu-
sive coherence~ it is claimed that the object is also present. 
But here the object is more a specie of the idea, than the 
idea of the object. An attempt is made to overcome this 
vagueness by introducing a transcendent endJ though this 
seems to be just another name for a necessary system of ideas. 
The definition of idea and object seems open to the charge · 
of circularity and initial predication. 
Blanshard1 s denial of time contradicts an obvious 
experience of maR. He claims to accept empirical evidences 
and to formulate his view in light of them, yet his theory 
denies this experience rather than explaining it. This 
denial.of time also leads to a failure to explain the locus 
of error in a non-temporal system. 
Finally, the failure to work out an adequate view 
of the subject, i.e., personality, weakens the theory. 
Blanshard often treats ideas as though they were self con-
tained persons themselves. The vagueness hovering around the 
relation of the subject and its ideas reveals the thorough-
going monism of the theory and its inadequate concept of 
personality. 
